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MANPOWER MANAGEMENT FOR JOINT SPECIALTY OFFICERS:
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
This thesis investigates the development of Title IV of
the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization
Act of 1986 and the Joint Specialty Officer (JSO)
management policies mandated by the law. Individual
service manpower management procedures for the
nomination/selection for Joint Professional Military
Education (JPME) and Joint Specialty Officer designation
are presented and analyzed. The size and composition of
the Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL) is also presented and
analyzed. The results indicate significant progress has
been made towards fulfilling the Title IV requirements
regarding JPME, JSO designation, and improving the quality
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The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorgan-
ization Act of 1986 established many significant and
far-reaching changes in the conduct of Department of
Defense affairs. The purpose of the law is:
1) to reorganize the Department of Defense and
strengthen civilian authority in the Department;
2) to improve the military advice provided to the
President, the National Security Council, and the
Secretary of Defense;
3) to place clear responsibility on the commanders of
the unified and specified combatant commands for
the accomplishment of missions assigned to those
commands;
4) to ensure that the authority of the commanders of
unified and specified combatant commands is fully
commensurate with the responsibility of those
commanders for the accomplishment of missions
assigned to their commands;
5) to increase attention to the formulation of
strategy and to contingency planning;
6) to provide for more efficient use of defense
resources;
7) to improve joint officer management policies; and
8) otherwise, to enhance the effectiveness of military
operations and improve the management and adaini-
stration of the Department of Defense, and for
other purposes. (Ref. 1: 993-994)
These changes are largely in response to many studies
and reports that focused on organization and personnel
problems affecting joint military operations. Several
-- 1
recent joint operations, in particular, were criticized for
joint organization inefficiencies. The aborted Iranian
hostage rescue mission and the reported communication and
coordination difficulties during the Grenada operation were
attributed to the inability of the services to coordinate
and successfully conduct joint operations [Ref. 2:359-370).
Additionally, the issue of the quality of personnel
assigned to joint duty assignments involving multi-service
or multi-national planning and operations was questioned by
Congress. This stirred interest and sparked debates in
Congress concerning the quality and capability of the
United States in joint military operations. Congress
wanted to effect changes in the Department of Defense (DOD)
organization and wanted to improve joint operations and
Lnter-service cooperation. The Goldwater-Nichols Act is
the result of Congress's desire to improve DOD functions.
1. Title IV
This thesis will focus specifically on Title IV of
the legislation, which details many requirements for the
creation and management of "Joint Specialty Officers"
(JSO). Title IV of the Act, Joint Officer Personnel
Policy, establishes the guidelines for joint officer
management and outlines detailed legislation to carry out
the restructuring of joint profesoional military education
(JPME) and joint duty assignments (JDA). To monitor
implementation of all the provisions, Congress has required
a significant array of reports from the Services,
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the Joint Staff, and the Secretary of Defense. The reports
are designed to show the extent to which each military
department is providing officers to fill that department's
share of joint duty assignments.
Title IV of the legislation also addresses require-
rents for establishing education and personnel management
policies for the joint specialty officer. Additionally,
Title IV details requirements for joint duty assignments as
prerequisite for promotion to general or flag officer
grade. Conaress also included many other detailed re-
quirements and restrictions on how the services are to
manage joint officers.
The cornerstone of Title IV is the requirement to
place top-quality officers in all joint duty assignments.
Some other key provisions of Title IV include:
1) Development of Joint Specialty Officers educated,
trained and oriented towards joint matters.
2) Development of a joint duty assignment list (JDAL)
qualifying specific multi-service or multi-national
billets for joint duty assignments.
3) Promotion rates for officers with joint duty
experience are expected to at least equal the
promotion rates for all officers of that armed
force in the same grade and category.
4) Assignment to a JDA as their next duty for all
officers with the Joint Specialty and at least
fifty percent of other officers completing joint
professional military education (JPME).
5) Completion of joint duty assignments as
prerequisite for promotion to general or flag
officer grades.
"3
6) Prescription that minimum joint duty tour shall
be 2 years for flag ranks (originally 3 years) and
3 years for other officers (originally 3 1/2
years).
7) Requirement that the Secretary of Defense issue
guidelines and require various reports to ensure
implementation of the legislation.
The Secretary of Defense is responsible for
establishing carser guidelines for officers with the joint
specialty. The guidelines shall include criteria for
selection, military education, training, types of duty
assignments, and other matters considered appropriate
[Ref. 1: 1025-1026).
2. Service Implementation
The services are currently implementing the
requirements of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation and
adjusting personnel management procedures to meet the
guidelines established by the Secretary of Defense. This
has not been done without critical evaluation and valuable
feedback (i.e., In statements before Congress in the
National Defense Authorization Acts of 1988 and 1989, the
services were united in stating tour lengths should be
reduced and extensions of transition periods were needed).
Additionally, a joint duty assignment management in-
formation system is being implemented in 1990 to improve
analysis capability and to help monitor tne achievement of
requirements and objectives established by statute or DOD
policies.
4
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Questions on how to select officers for the Joint
Specialty Officer billets, how to ensure joint professional
military education requirements are met, how to monitor
promotion criteria, how to integrate various military
occupational specialty career paths into the joint program,
and how to keep track of the Joint Specialty Officers
subsequent duty assignments are areas the services are
currently grappling with.
Each of the services appear to be supportive of the
intent of the law, which is primarily to improve the
performance of officers in joint duty positions by est-
ablishing management procedures for their selection,
education, assignments, and promotions. However, imple-
menting the requirements of the legislation has proven to
be more difficult. The Secretary of Defense's guidelines'
combined with service cooperation and feedback has led to
several changes in the legislation (detailed in Chapter
III). Service procedures for Joint Specialty Officer
management and the impact of officer personnel assigniment
policies continue to be developed and adjusted.
The law governing joint officer personnel manage-
ment, Title IV of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of
Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, is complex and presents
some significant challenges to the military officer
management process. Effectively balancing the educational
requirements, joint duty assignments, and military occupa-
tional specialties with qualified personnel will require
5
detailed attention by the personnel assignment moni-
tors/detailers and individual officers.
B. PURPOSE OF THESIS
The purpose of this thesis is to improve the
methodology for selecting and managing Joint Specialty
Officers. Matching career paths, occupational specialties,
and joint duty assignments with qualified personnel will be
a primary goal.
Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps personnel
management procedures are evaluated and compared. Joint
professional military education requirements, specific tour
lengths, occupational skill requirements, operational
requirements, and waivers are examined.
The leglislation mandates specific requirements for
minimum joint tour lengths, critical joint duty
assignments, joint specialty officers, joint professional
military education, promotion rates, and other detailed
requirements. The Services' procedures and policies to
implement the various detailed requirements will be
compared with legislative requirements. This comparison
could be beneficial to future personnel management planning
and policy implementation. Individual Joint Specialty
Officers could also benefit by being selected, assigned,
and managed in a more effective manner.
6
C. OUTLINE OF THESIS
Chapter II deals with the background leading to the
Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act
of 1986. Chapter III describes Title IV, and details the
legislative requirements for the Joint Duty Assignment
List, selection of Joint Specialty Officers, and various
criteria to ensure quality officers are assigned and
continuity enhanced in the joint service arena.
Chapter IV explains the procedures used for:
1) Joint Professional Military Education selection;
2) Joint Specialty Officer nomination and selection;
and
3) composition of the Joint Duty Assignment List.
The joint officer personnel management policies and
procedures of the services are presented for comparison.
Chapter V presents the analysis of the Joint Specialty
Officer management process and JPME/JDA selection pro-
cedures. Chapter VI states the conclusions and recom-
mendations for future joint officer personnel management.
Chapter VI also provides suggestions and recommendations
for further research.
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II. GENESIS OF TITLE IV
A. OVERVIEW
A review of the historical basis for reforming the
Department of Defense and a look at some of the issues
leading to previous reorganization efforts will help to lay
a firm foundation for understanding some of the current
reorganization legislative details of Title IV. This
thesis will focus on joint personnel management, but many
of the services' organizational roots have been embedded
through parochial idealogies and previous reorganization
efforts. This chapter will review some of the background
and historical events leading to the most recent studies on
Defense Department reorganization and joint military
operations.
Since the Department of Defense (DOD) was established
in 1947, the need to have effective and cohesive armed
forces able to conduct successful joint operations has been
a constant goal and struggle. The current framework in
which Joint duty is developed is, in hindsight, an
outgrowth of the structure that developed during and after
World War II. The war experiences requiring closely
coordinated and mutually supported operations by land, sea,
and a4r forces nrovided the impetus to change the
organizational structure of the United States Military.
Along with organizational changes came personnel
rquirements and adjustments--the need for more unification
8
of the separate armed forces, greater joint efforts, and
the creation of a Joint Staff.
The Defense Department emerged from the reorganization
of tne War Department and the Navy Department into one
centrally managed organization. The military
organizational structure continued to evolve over time.
The National Security Act of 1947 was followed by a series
of changes in the law, such as the 1949 amendments, and the
reorganization efforts of 1953 and 1958. These reform
initiatives were designed to strengthen the military advice
given to the President, enforce organizational structure,
and develop the Joint Staff. [Ref. 2:passim)
Several poorly coordinated military operations in the
early 1980's and numerous reorganization proposals sparked
Congress into action for developing a plan for reform.
Increasing defense budgets, publicity of bureaucratic
acquisition practices, failed military operations, and
internal complaints of inefficiencies led to a series of
investigations, hearings, and studies. Many findings
eventually became subjects for debate and further
investigations, many of which are incorporated in the
Goldwater-Nichols Act. Many organizational and personnel
changes were proposed and eventually formulated into law
with the 1986 reform.
Althoucgh the DOD has oftQn beon adjusted and
restruatured, the reform and reorqanization attempts have
rover been of the magnitude and lepth included in the
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Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act
of 1986. What began as a review and analysis of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (JCS) soon engulfed the entire DOD
organization. The 1986 legislation became the most
comprehensive review and recommendation package of
reorganization DOD ever experienced.
B. THE BEGINN.ING OF THE JOINT STRUCTURE
Missions, money, and even individual service survival
increased the tendency toward competitive rather than
complementary service relationships. As the military
institutions evolved, they deveoloped primarily into a
land-based force and sea-based force with each attempting
to establish independence and autonomy. As the national
geo-political strategies changed, along with the
development of air power and nuclear weapons, the
competition between the services often intensified as they
struggled for limited resources.
The Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps evolved
independently into distinctly different organizations with
separate missions, policies, and traditions. Cooperation
was often victim of competition--competition for missions,
roles, funding, and survival. Budget priorities, military
missions, roles, and strategic and logistic eiiphasis were
oriented in two primary directions: 1) land war~are and 2)
maritime warfare. Developing a structure to effectively
employ the armed forces in joint operationit and planning
would prove to be a continuous task.
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1. World War II
Although some joint operations were conducted prior
to World War II, this war first brought the aspect of joint
operations to the forefront. British Prime Minister
Winston Churchill had a committee composed of the leaders
of the British military services. When the United States
and Great Britain planned to coordinate strategies and
operations for the conduct of the war, President Franklin
Roosevelt established the Joint Chiefs cf Staff (JCS).
However, the formation of the JCS did not end service
partisanship; consequently, both cooperation and
coordination were slow in developing. The victories in
Europe and Japan via land, sea, and air overshadowed the
neophyte difficulties of joint operations encountered by
the services.
Service partisanship and inadequate coordination
resulted in many delays on critial issues during World War
II. However, traditional service roles of land and sea
warfare were the norm, and highly qualified leaders were in
prominent positions throughout the war. General Eisenhower
commanded Europe and Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur
commanded separate theaters in the Pacific. Their advice
and access to the decision making bodies of government, the
legislative and executive branches, helped the U.S. plan
towards victory. Strategic planning emphasized stopping
Germany and supporting our allies in Europe first, then the
Pacific theater. Despite the relative inefficiencies of
11
joint operations, many successful joint campaigns employing
land, sea, and air forces led to victory in both Europe and
Japan. The size of the armed forces approached four
million people with a tremendous amount of equipment,
ships, and added flexibility created by the war economy.
The credibility of the service chiefs as trusted military
advisors also began developing during the planning and
combat operations of World War II.
2. Pont World War II
Numerous studies were initiated after the war in an
attempt to find a structure that would provide an
effective, more efficient method of integrating and running
the Department of Defense. There were some efforts to
unify the military branches into one service with a
separate branch for land, sea and air forces. The Army
favored a highly integrated post-war military, but the Navy
opposed that concept. The Air Force, then still part of
the Army, was interested in becoming a separate service.
The final result was the National Security Act of 1947 and
the forme.tion of the Department of Defense with three
separate services.
This post-war Security Act was the first effort
toward a different defense establishment, and the three
separate Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force were
formed. The Joint Chiefs of Staff was established as a
pGrmanent organization. The JCS served as the principal
military advisors on military policy, organization,
12
strategy, and plans to the President and the Secretary of
Defense. The 1947 Act also established the Joint Staff for
JCS support and gave specific guidance to the JCS tu:
1) prepare stiategic and joint logistical plans for
the services;
2) assign logistical responsibilities to the services;
3) establish unified commands in strategic areas where
such unified commands are in the interest of
national security;
4) formulate training and education policies for their
servicesi
5) review major material and personnel requirements of
the military forces. (Ref. 3: 138)
Several amendments were made to the National
Security Act during the succeeding decades. The Office of
the Secretary of Defense was strengthened in the 1949
National Security Act. Additionally, the JCS was
designated as principal military advisor to the National
Security Council: the chairman position of JCS was
established; and the Joint Staff size increased from 100 to
210 officers (Ref. 3:138]. The Commandant of the Marine
Corps was included in the JCS in 1952 for matters involving
the Marine Corps.
The 1953 reorganization efforts gave the JCS
Chairman more power over the predominately service-oriented
Joint Staff personnel. The changes in 1953 gave the
Chairman additional authority to approve appointment and
tenure of the Joint Staff and to manage the work of the
Joint Staff. Responsibility for the conduct of operations
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was transferred to the Unified commanders. Movement toward
a more unified, coordinated Department of Defense and away
from individual service parochialism led to many of the
modifications, adjustments, and restructuring in the DOD.
The last major reorganization effort came in 1958.
President Eisenhower declared to Congress that "separate
ground, sea and air warfare is gone forever .... we must be
prepared to fight as one, regardless of service. [Ref.
3:139]"
Congress subsequently passed the Department of
Defense Reorganization Act of 1958. The Act:
1) removed the individual secretaries of the military
departments from the chain of command:
2) insured the JCS could only act under the authority
of the Secretary of Defense:
3) gave the Chairman of the JCS a vote in
deliberations:
4) transtered control of the Joint Staff to the
Chairman:
5) increased the size of the Joint Staff from 210 to
400 officers:
6) organized the JCS staff into numbered directorates
of a conventional military staff [Ref. 3: 139].
These 1956 changes shifted command of U.S. military
forces directly to the combatant commanders. The corporate
structure of the JCS remained that of a committee seeking
unanimity for remolving issuen. No other major reorgan-
izational efforts occurred after 1958 until the 1980s The
structure was modified in 1967 %hen the service chiefs
14
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terms were increased from two to four years. The Com-
mandant of the Marine Corps was made a full member of the
JCS in 1978. Table I is a listing of most of the major
studies and changes to the Department of Defense that have
occurred. The post-World War II and the post-Vietnam War
time periods sparked the most interest and activity for
evaluations and studies.
In sum, a multitude of changes have occurred in the
Department of Defense and the development of the joint
structure. Many of the adjustments and restructuring
efforts have improved the efficiency of the organizations
within the DOD. The role of the JCS has developed and
matured to become a critical military advisor for the
President, Secretary of Defense, and the National Security
Council. The foundation for the Joint Staff has been laid.
The organization, as a whole, has improved. However, there
are still deficiencies as demonstrated during the ill-fated
Iranian hostage rescue attempt and the Grenada operation.
The next two sections will address these deficiencies and
detail the current reform initiatives that led to the 1986
Reorganization Act.
C. RECENT JOINT OPERATIONS
A brief look at two recent joint operations will help
to show why concern was again raised on how to reform the
Department of Defense and, specifically, joint operitions.
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Table I STUDIES AND PLANS ON DEFENSE REFORM [Ref. 3:1413
408AAWM2044
April 1945 Spqcial Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee Report on
Reorganization of National Defense
Sept. 1945 Eberstadt Committee Report
Oct. 1945 Collins Plan
April 1946 Thomas Bill
Jan. 1947 Army-Navy Compromise Plan (Norstad-Sherman Plan)
Feb. 1947 President Truman's National Security Act of 1947
Nov. 1948 Eberstadt Committee (of the Hoover Commission) Report
Feb. 1949 Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the
Government (Hoover Commission) Report
March 1949 Tydings Bill
April 1953 Rockefeller Committee Report
April 1953 President Eisenhower's Reorganization Plan
June 1953 Hoffman Plat,
Jan. 1959 Wheeler Committee Report
April 1958 President Eisenhower's Reorganization Plan
Dec. 1960 Symington Study on Reorganization of the Department of
Defense
July 1970 Blue Ribbon Defense Panel (Fitzhugh) Report
June 19798 Ignatius Report on Defense Reorganization
July 1978 Steadman Committee Report on National Military Command
Structure
Feb. 1979 Defense Resource Management (Rice) Report
Sept. 1979 National Security Policy Integration Report
Dec. 1961 Joint Planning and Execution Steering Committee Report
Feb. 19SE Two separate reports of the Chairman's (of the JCS)
Special Study Group
Feb. 1982 General Jones's Reorganization Proposal
April 1982 General Meyer's Reform Proposal
Aug. 1983 House Armed Services Committee Reorganization Proposals
for the JCS
1983 Krulak (U. S. Strategic Institute) Study
1983 Byron (National War College Strategic Studies) Study
April 1984 Senate Armed Services Committee Study on the JCS and DOD
Sept. 1984 Hudson Institute Committee Report on Civillian-Military
Relationships
Nov. 1984 DOD Review of JCS Reorganizational Proposals
Feb. 1985 Georgetown University Center for Strategic and
Inte inational Studies Report
Nov. 1985 MLses (National Defense University National Security
Essay) Study
Oct. 1985 Senate Armed Services Committee Staff Report on Defense
Organization
June 1986 President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management
(Packard Cr mission)
Oct. 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization
Act of 1986
,i, . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . m- -- i Sl1
lb
1. The Iranian Hostage Rescue Mission
The aborted Iranian hostage rescue attempt wat
probably one of the most widely publicized joint operations
in recent years. There were complex coordination problems
in the planning, training, and execution of the rescue
mission. The Staff Report states, "The most serious
criticism of the organization of the rescue operation is
the charge that all four services insisted on participating
in the mission, even though the participation of all four
was unnecessary or even harmful. In other words, each
service demanded a piece of the action (Ref. 2: 361]."
Every service wanted to be represented in the
rescue mission and that did nct enhance cohesion and
integration. An exercise that had Marine pilots flying
M M helicopters carrying A M troops supported by the Air
Force appeared t4' be quite "Joint" oriented. However, the
mix was considered a major contributing factor to thG
failure of the rescue attempt. The mission was aoorted
prior to the mishap that killed eight people. This joint
operation did not have the dedicated assets in organiza-
tional structure and training to ensure success.
The Senate Armed Services Committee's Report,
DAfnse Organization: The Need for Change, discussed
inefficiencies in planning, training, and the organiza-
tional problems of the Joint Task Force. Future joint
operations must involve the use of educated and capable
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officers in the combined forces to assist in the develop-
ment of planning and training of the Joint Task Forces.
2. Grenada
The joint operation on the island of Grenada in
1983 was successful despite organizational shortcomings.
The operation, URGENT FURY, demonstrated recent major
deficiencies in the Armed Forces ability to work jointly
when deployed rapidly. Senator Sam Nunn stated, "A close
look at the Grenada operation can only lead to the con-
clusion that, despite our victory and success, despite the
performance of individual troops who fought bravely, the
U.S. Armed Forces have serious problems conducting joint
operations [Ref. 4:22]." Some of the senior commanders in
all services reportedly displayed a lack of understanding
about the capabilities, assets, and tactics of the other
services. The lack of coordination, organization, and
planning drew criticism and showed an inability to work
joint operations from the primarily independent service's
organizational structures (Ref. 2:363-370].
The Vice-Admiral responsible for the Joint Task
Force had no Army personnel on his staff; only one general
and two majors were assigned to his staff on an emergency
basis. Furthermore, there was no unified ground commander
on Grenada which caused some coordination problems.
Additionally, the Military Airlift Comnand retained control
over some Air Force aircraft. Communications difficulties
between the services were linked to:
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1) separate purchasing avenues for equipment,
2) incompatibility of equipment, and
3) procedural differences.
Airlift logistical support and limited coordination on
priorities contributed to organizational deficiencies. The
thrust of Title IV of Goldwater-Nichols is that increased
joint professional military education, increased
familiarity with the capabilities and limitations of other
services, and increased experience with more joint planning
and operations could have prevented some of these pr,,blems.
Poor organization for Joint operations was listed
as a primary causal factor for the planning, communication,
and logistical difficulties. Multi-service participation
in the planning of the operation could have identified many
of the weaknesses. That coordination and planning did not
occur. Logistical planning and support was inadequate--
required vehicles, weapons, rations and equipment were not
supplied. In fact, the Army created "a unique supply
system because its existing supply channels proved too
cumbersome" (Ref: 2:369).
The inability of the services to work together
effectively is linked with how the services continue to
operate independently, even at the level of Unified
command. The Senate Armed Services Committee report
concluded that the failure of the Joint Task Force Com-
mander in Grenada to be familiar with Army and Air Force
tactics and assets, and the failure of the senior Army
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commanders to be aware of the problems of working with the
Navy demonstrated the organization's faults and inability
to work together [Ref. 2:370].
D. RECENT REORGANIZATION PROPOSALS
Air Force General and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff in the early 1980s, David Jones, and Army Chief of
Staff, General Edward Meyer, were the catalysts for the
latest DOD reform initiatives. Dissatisfaction with the
way the JCS and the military were operating along with
perceived and real inefficiencies led these top service
representatives to voice their criticisms of the system. A
series of independent civil. and congrussional studies on
DOD reform were subsequently initiated. This section will
review several key studies and initiatives that led to the
Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.
1. General Jones' Reorganization Proposal
General David C. Jones' credentials for JCS
criticisms were unmatched. He served on the JCS for eight
years, as its chairman for four of those years, under four
Presidents and four Secretaries of Defense. He had many
joint tours and staff tours prior to his tenure on the JCS.
He stated that "despite many studies that have periodically
documented problems with this military committee system and
made cogent recommendations for improvement, the system has
been remarkably resistant to change [Ref. 5:62]." The
General claimed that stepping aside from long standing
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service positions and objectively assessing the joint
system could provide a clearer direction for reform.
General Jones compared the JCS running the U.S.
military to that of a conventional bureaucracy. He wrote:
The Joint Chiefs of Staff, if viewed as thE-
military board of a government corporation, would
provide some striking contrast to organization and
management principles followed in the private sector:[the] Board consists of five directors, all insiders,
four of whom simultaneously head line divisions ....
reports to the chief executive and a cabinet member
.... [and is] supported by a corporate staff which
draws all its officerr from line divisions and turns
over every two years .... Line divisions control
officer assignments and advancements; there is no
transfer of officers among line divisions .... Board
meets three times a week to address operational as well
as policy matters, which normally are first reviewed by
a four-layered committee system involving full parti-
cipation of division staffs from the start .... At 75%
of the Board meetings one or more of the directors are
represented by substitutes .... If the Board can't
reach unanimous agreement on an issue, it must--by
law--inform its superiors .... At least the four top
leadership and management levels within the corporation
receive the same basic compensation, set by two
committees consisting of a total of 535 members
and any personnel changes in the top three levels
(about 150 positions) must be approved in advance by
one of the committees. [Ref. 5:621
Despite this sarcastic look at the operations of
the JCS, many improvements to the joint program were cited
by General Jones. These improvements include:
1) development of a broader joint exercise proaram;
2) establishment of a Joint Deployment Agency to
integrate deployment plans and activities;
3) revamping the joint education system;
4) organizational adjustments for better integration
of the joint command, control and communication
systems;
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5) establishment of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task
Force and others [Ref. 5:67).
General Jones divided the most serious deficiencies
into two categories: personnel and organizational. He
stated more time was needed to be dedicated to war-fighting
capabilities and less on the intramural scramble for
resources (Ref. 5:67]. He criticized the failure of the
system, and the services, to adequately prepare officers
for cross-service and joint experience. Limited incentives
and rewards inhibited top quality officers from pursuing
joint duty. Low tenure and high turnover in key positions
contributed to the instability of the joint personnel
structure. Inexperience with other services and the lack
of senior officers experiencing Joint Staff work con-
tributed to the limited joint knowledge base. Joint Staff
officers were still primarily "service-oriented" and the
influence of service parochialism often limited "Joint"
thinking.
The perception held by many was that the military
services had historically not considered duty on the Joint
Staff of the JCS, the staffs of the warfighting commands,
and other similar joint organizations to be as important as
duty within the services themselves. Therefore, the
military departments had not assigned their best officers
to joint duty. Congress believed that those officers that
did serve well in joint organizations were not fairly
recognized with rewarding assignments, promotions, and
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educational opportunitiew. The result was that both their
careers and their joint organizations suffered.
General Jones went on to write:
Any institution that imbues its members with
traditions doctrines and discipline is likely to findit quite difficult to assess changes in its environment
with a high degree of objectivity. Dee p-seated Service
traditions are important in fostering a fighting
spirit, Service pride and heroism, but they may also
engender a tendency to look inward and to perpetuate
doctrines and thought patterns that do not keep pace
with changing requirements. Since fresh approaches to
strategy tend to threaten an institution'. interests
and self-image, it is often more comfortable to look to
the past than to seek new ways to meet the challenges
of the future. When coupled with a system that keepsService leadership bound up in a continuous struggle
for resources, such inclinations can lead to a pre-
occupation with weapon systems, techniques, and tactics
at the expense of sound strategic planning.
Furthermore, officers come from and return to
their Services which control their assignments and
promotions. The strong Service string thus attached to
a Joint Staff officer (and to those assigned to the
Unified Commands as well) provides little incentive,--
and often considerable disincentive--for officers to
seek Joint duty or to differ with their Service
position in joint deliberations. [Ref. 5:68]
The message is that the people being assigned to
the Joint Staff have little incentive to be there and the
military departments have not been sending many of their
best people. Organizational difficulties encountered on
the Joint Staff ranged from committee compromises to
parochial politics of the individual services (since the
"Service string" is still attached). The competition for
scarce resources, including people, that are allocated to
the services is forecast to increase as the resources
become more constrained by budgetary cuts. Increasing the
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longevity by increasing the tour lengths could help with
strategic planning. Long range planning for fiscal
resources, including a five-year budget plan, is often
disrupted by urgent issues (i.e., Libya, Middle East,
etc.).
General Jones proposed three specific areas that
needed changes:
i1 Strengthen the role of the Chairman of the JCS.
The Chairman of the JCS should be the principal
military advisor to the President. The Chairman
should be authorized a deputy to assist in joint
activities ensuring readiness, improving war
planning, and managing the joint exercising of the
combatant forces.
21 Limit Service Staff involvement in the joint pro-
M$.
The Joint Staff should provide advice on matters
involving more than one service. The service
staffs should advise service chiefs on service
matters, but the Joint Staff should advise on joint
issues. Service-centered interests should be
limited by focusing the staffing more towards joint
decisions.
31 araden the training. experience and rewards forjoint d=.
More officers should have more tours of duty injoint assignments during their careers, and they
should be rewarded for doing so. Additionally, the
oint education system should be expanded and
mproved [Ref. 5:72).
General Jones urqed Congress to go beyond tinkering
with the system and make some detailed changas. Congress
eventually accepted the challenge and began four years of
hearings, inveE -igations, and reports that culminated in
the 1986 Reorganization Act.
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2. General Hair'a Reform Proposal
Army General Edward C. Meyer followed General
Jones' proposal and advocate& even stronger nr;anizational
reform measures. General Meyer also identified three major
problem areas for reform:
11 Dual-hatting for top Service positions needed to bereduced.
Dual-hatting or divided loyalty impairs the ability
of top service leaders to provide sound, usable,
and timely military advice to civilian leadership.
21 Include operational_ lanning in the resource
a.1locAtionprocess.
operational plans need to be incorporated into the
resource allocation and determination process.
Combatant commanders need to be included in the
determination of needs and requirements.
3) Combatant commanders' roles need to be
st~rengthened.
The commanders must be involved in the defense
decision-making process for their theater of
operations (Ref. 6:88].
General Meyer's proposals state that tinkering with
the system will not suffice. The issues of providing a
structure to insure that civilian leaders receive the best
and most usable military advice possible, and ensuring the
organization is structured to work in wartime are impor-
tant. Ensuring commanders are given sufficient guidance
and resources to do operational planning for future joint
contingencies are also critical. Evaluating these types of
organizational changes should improve the overall function
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of the DOD organizations and the JCS structure. [Ref.
6:90]
3. JCS Reorganization Act of 1983
General Jones' and General Meyer's proposals led to
legislative inquiries into the structure and organization
of the JCS. House Report 3718 proposed several legislative
changes to the structure and operation of the JCS. The
role of the Chairman of the JCS and various personnel
problems were addressed in the House legislation, but the
Bill was never voted on in the Senate and faded away [Ref.
3:140]. Improving joint operations and removing the
difficulties encountered from multi-command chains remained
a principle goal of various reorganization efforts.
4. Senate Armed Services Committee Report
Meanwhile, the House Armed Services Committee
(HASC) and Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) continued
their inquiries, hearings, and investigations of the JCS
and DOD structure. The SASC distributed a staff report in
1995, Defense Organization: The Need for Change, which
left little about the Defense Department organization
untouched.
The 1985 SASC conducted its investigation and held
hearings that included hundreds of top DOD officials. The
SASC reported an imbalance between service and joint
interests. There was no clear policy making level present
in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of
Staff, or the Military Departments. Additionally, national
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strategic goals were not clearly addressed. A predominance
of service interests over joint interests within DOD was
cited as a problem of balance, which has precluded the most
efficient allocation of Defense resources. Specified and
Unified Commanders appeared more concerned about their
piece of the budget pie than in helping to formulate
stratedy for their area of concern. Therefore, national
strategic goals were unclear because of inattention to
strategic planning. Bureaucratic red tape and inadequate
quality of personnel assigned to Joint Staff positions were
also identified as problem areas. The SASC investigations
and hearings disclosed that part of the joint coordination
problems were caused by the services placing inexperienced
officers on Joint staffs and a high turnover rate for
officers assigned to the staffs. [Ref. 2:passim)
In all, the SASC report included 91 recommendations
for changes. Many of the recommendations were included in
the 1986 Reorganization legislation. Noteworthy recom-
mendations included:
1) Strengthen the role of the Chairman of the JCS;
2) Strengthen the role of the Combatant Commanders;
3) Establish the Vice-Chairman of the JCS position;
4) Formulate strategic planning policy procedures;
5) Give more autonomy to the Unified and Specified
Commanders;
6) Establish Joint Specialty Officer Programs; and
7) Establish ProfesLional Military Education
guidelines. [Ref. 2: passim)
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The growing concern over military capability led to
these discussions and debates about potential changes to
"fix" the military system. Congress, in its strong desire
to push joint operations and cooperation, implemented
several specific detailed legislative requirements in the
Reorganization Act. The 1986 Reorganization Act
unanimously passed the Senate on May 7th with a 95-0 vote.
The House vote was 406-4 on August 5th. The House and
Senate Conference Committee met August 13-September 11 to
resolve differences, and on September 16th and 17th
legislation was agreed to in the Senate and House,
respectively. President Reagan signed the Reorganization
Act into law October 1, 1986. [Ref. 7:7-8)
E. SUMMARY
The increased trend toward centralization in DOD
funct:.ons, supported by the large body of academic work and
coupletd with e stream of military failures (i.e., Iranian
hostaqe rescue attempt, Grenada) served to bring the issue
of military .:eform to critical mass in the mid-1980's.
Title IV is only a small but strategic part of the Reorgan-
ization Act, as Congress attempts to correct perceived and
real inter-service coordination problems within the DOD.
Many of the above listed studies and proposals focused
on weaknesses or deficiencies of the DOD. These weaknesses
do not imply that the DOD is completely inefficient.
Indeed, many functions and operations in the DOD are
unparalleled in excellence and mission accomplishmerts.
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The purpose of this background was to review the direction
and context of many organizational and personnel changes
that have occurred since World War II. The next chapter
details the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986, focusing on Title IV, Joint
Officer Personnel Policy. The requirements of the 1986 law
will be outlined along with amendments from 1987, 1988, and
1989.
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III. THE LAW AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION
A. OVERVIEW
This chapter details the requirements of Title IV to
show the scope of the joint personnel management problem.
First, an overview of the key provisions of Title IV are
presented. Next, the major sections of chapter 38, United
States Code Title 10, created by the Reorganization Act are
described to show the detailed requirements for
implementing the legislation. The final section describes
implementation progress by summarizing several previous
studies conducted on the joint duty assignment list and the
impact of Title IV on joint personnel management.
B. KEY PROVISIONS OF TITLE IV
Title IV of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 created a special category of
officers for joint duty assignments, the Joint Specialty
Officer (JSO). The education, training, and designation of
these Joint Specialists are designed to strengthen the
joint expertise placed in field grade and general/flag
grade officer billets. The goal of Title IV is "to improve
the performance of officers in joint duty positions by
establishing management procedures for their selection,
education, assignment and promotion (Ref. 1:2]." However,
certain provisions of the legislation must be discussed to
understand their significance to the joint officer
personnel management and assignment difficulties.
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The Reorganization Act requires the Secretary of
Defense to select officers for the joint specialty with the
advice and consent of the Chairman of the Jcint Chiefs of
Staff (CJCS). It further requires the military departments
to nominate qualified officers for selection as Joint
Specialty Officers (JSO). Under the requirements of the
law, officers nominated for the Joint specialty may not be
selected until they successfully complete an appropriate
program at a Joint Professional Military Education (JPME)
school and successfully complete a full tour of duty in a
Joint Duty Assignment (JDA).
1. Joint Professional Military Education (JPME)
One of the JSO requirements stipulated that an
officer be educated in joint matters. To meet this
requirement, the law mandates (with certain exceptions)
that officers receive JPMF and then serve in a joint tour
prior to their designation as a JSO. JPME credit was
originally obtained at only three colleges--the Industrial
College of the Armed Forces, National War College, and the
Armed Forces Staff College. This limitation created a
problem for the services because the law also required that
one-half of the Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL) be filled
by a JSO or TSO nominee. The services protested that the
number of school seats available at the three schools would
not be &dequate to ensure compliance with the requirement
to fill fiity percent of the Joint Duty Assignment List
(JDAL) with Joint Specialists. Consequently, the
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intermediate level and senior .- vel service school syllabi
were modified to provide a joint track alternative to the
normal service-oriented syllabus and increase the number of
officers becoming eligible for JSO designation.
The currently evolving JPME system results from the
Department of Defense's desire to improve understanding of
joint matters and to meet the specific requirements of the
law. Congressional interest in JPME has increased as a
result of Representative Ike Skelton's detailed study on
the military education system (Ref. 8].
Representative Skelton's study detailed many
recommendations, including a two-phase JPME program that
has since been incorporated into the Title IV legislation
by amendment. Phase I is conducted at the service
intermediate and senior level schools and Phase II at the
Armed Forces Staft College. The Phase I education will
still focus on service-oriented education and operational
skills, but a major shift in the emphasis toward Joint
Operations and interservice coordination will be taught.
The student loading from each military service department
has been xdJusted to ensure better representation from each
service branoi for the seminars and classes. The faculty
of each school should also represent each military
department to improve the "joint" perspective ot the
educational courses. The Phase II program is similarly
adjusted for student and faculty representation. Phase II
is desi.gned to be taught Jn a three month program of
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temporary duty. Furthermore, Phase II is not intended to
repeat the learning principles and objectives found in
Phase I. [Ref. 8)
Congress, realizing that the services could not
meet the letter of the law immediately in qualifying
officers as Joint Specialty Officers, established a two
year transition period in which the Secretary of Defense
could waive certain prerequisites foi designating JSOs.
This authority allowed the Secretary to waive either the
requirement for JPME or the full JDA tour requirement, but
not both. The Fiscal Year 1989 Defense Authorization Act
authorized an extension of the transition period for an
additional year. Balancing the unique requirements of the
law, providing JPME to the officer corps, and meeting the
wishes of Congress presents a great challenge to the
services joint personnel managers.
2. Joint Duty Assiqnsent (JDA)
A Joint Duty Assignment involves:
assignment to a designated position in a multi-Service
or multinational command or activity that is involved
in the integrated employment or rupport of the land,
sea, and air forces of at least two of the three
Military Departments. Such involvement includes, but
is not limited to, matters relating to national
military strategy, joint doctrine and policy, strategic
planning, contingency planning, and command and control
of combat operations under a unified command. [Ref. 9:
II-13
The Secretary of Defonse, in close cooperation with
the Joint Staff and the services, is required to publish a
list of Joint Duty Assignments and identify those that ars
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critical joint duty assignments. The size and composition
of the Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL) is the primary
determinant of the services' ability to meet the exacting
requirements of the law. The need to develop a JDAL that
provides adequate opportunity with respect to general/flag
officer grade qualification has resulted in the present
list of approximately 8,900 JDA positions. Table II shows
the distribution of billets for 1990 with the majority of
JDA billets being assigned to the 0-5 (lieutenant
colonel/commander) grades. The size of the JDAL has
remained fairly constant and has maintained a consistent
distribution of billets to each branch despite numerous
adjustments to the individual billets.
TABLE II 1990 JOINT DUTY ASSIGNMENT LIST BY SERVICE AND
RANK
RANN
Q 4 2 Q1 07-010 TOTAL PERNAG
ARMY 1120 1404 618 97 3239 36
NAVY 620 765 404 66 1855 21
AIR FORCE 1222 1300 640 93 3315 37
MARINE CORPS 185 216 73 15 489 6
TOTAL 3147 3745 1735 280 8907 100
Source: J-1, Joint Staff
The JDAL is a critical factor in the personnel
management of joint duty assignments because some billets
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require specific occupational skills, service affiliations,
and ranks. Personnel management hinges on aesigning top
quality people in the billets designated for joint duty
credit on the JDAL. The billets are further categorized as
either joint or joint critical billets. 1  Table III shows
the diatribution of critical billets. The number of
critical billets are 192 for the Navy, 390 for the Army,
381 for the Air Force, and 62 for the Marine Corps.
TABLE III 1990 JOINT DUTY CRITICAL BILLETS BY SERVICE
AND RANK
AEM
SERVI Q 07-OQ TOTAL P
ARMY 185 186 19 390 38
NAVY 74 104 14 192 19
AIR FORCE 187 175 19 381 37
MARINE CORPS 30 29 3 62 6
TOTAL 476 494 55 1025 100
Source: J-1, Joint Staff
relative percentages for each service for critical billets
are comparable to the percentages of the JDAL billets for
each military department.
1Critical billets are positions for which it is highly
important that the assigned officer be trained in and
oriented toward the integrated employment of land, sea, and
air forces.
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3. Joint Specialty officer (JSO)
One of the key aims of the Title IV legislation was
to establish a joint duty specialty that would provide
highly qualified officers for multiple joint tours. The
Joint Specialty Officer was created to achieve this goal.
A JSO is an officer who is "educated and experienced in the
employment and support of Unified and Combined forces to
achieve national security objectives [Ref. 9:111-1]."
Additionally, JSOs are to provide continuity for joint
matters and act as mentors within the joint arena and their
own services.
As indicated earlier, the law requires that one-
half of the billets on the JDAL be filled by a JSO or JSO
nominee. Consequently, the individual military departments
began holding selection boards for Joint Specialty Officers
in 1987 to determine the initial cadre of joint
specialists. It currently takes about four years (three
years for a critical occupational specialty) for an officer
to qualify as a joint specialist because of the JPME and
JDA completion requirements. To become a JSO nominee, an
officer must have partially completed the prerequisites for
designation as a JSO.
The legislation has given some relief to the
critical war-fighting specialties, defined as Critical
Occupational Specialty (COS). These occupations are shown
in Table IV. Officers with critical occupational
specialties may be nominated for the joint specialty by
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either attending JPME or being assigned a Joint duty
assignment; the sequencing of JPME and JDA may be reversed
TABLE IV CRITICAL OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTIES BY SERVICE
Infantry Surface
Armor Submarine
Field Artillery Special Operations








A r Weapons Director Aviation
Missile Operations Engineers
Space Operations Air Support/Air Control/
Anti-Air Warfare
Source: JCS Admin PUB 1.2
for COS officers. Additionally, instead of the required 3
year tour, a COS officer may fill a JDA billet for only 2
years and still receive joint duty credit. The purpose of
this is to help ensure that critical operational and war-
fighting skills are not adversely affected and to prevent
personnel shortages in operational units.
4. Joint Duty Tour Length
The law initially called for joint tours of three
years for general/flag officers and three and a half years
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for field grade officers. This created many conflicts with
Service officer assignment policies and reduced flexibility
for managing personnel assignments. Service criticism led
to legislative changes that lowered the minimum tour
lengths to two and three years, respectively.
Additionally, several provisions have been enacted that
allow officers who have a critical occupational specialty
to serve an initial joint tour that is less than the
mandated two years.
5. Promotions
Another key provision of Title IV involves details
regarding promotion policies. The law states that the
Secretary of Defense will ensure the qualifications of
officers assigned to joint duty assignmente are such that
officers who have served on the Joint Staff or who are JSOs
will be promoted at a rate at least equal to their military
department's headquarters average. Similarly, officers who
have served in other type of JDAs are expected to be
promoted at a rate at least equal to their service's
average.
This provision was not to force increased
promotions for JSOs, but rather to ensure that JSOe
selected are sufficiently qualified to maintain promotion
rates comparable to headquarters staffs and other officers.
The Secretary of Defense is required to furnish to
the se:retaries of the military departments promotion board
guidelines for the purpose of ensuring appropriate
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consideration of joint duty. Each selection board must
consider officers who are serving in, or have served in,
joint duty assignments and include at least one officer
designated by the CJCS who is currently serving in a joint
duty assignment. The CJCS will review the report of each
selection board for the purpose of determining if the
selection board's actions were consistent with joint duty
consideration guidelines. This review is to ensure
appropriate consideration was given to the performance of
officers who are serving or have served in joint duty
assignments.
The law also requires, subject to waiver by the
Secretary of Defense, that an officer may not be promoted
to general or flag rank unlesa the officer has completed a
joint duty assignment tour. An exemption until January
1994 is listed for Naval officers designated as qualified
nuclear propulsion officers. The Secretary of Defense may
waive the requirement for officers only on a case-by-case
basis. If tha waiver is given for the "good of the
service", then the first duty assignment shall be in a
joint duty assignment.
In addition, when an officer is recommended to the
President for an initial appointment to lieutenant general
or vice admiral, or for an initial appointment to the grade
of general or admiral, the CJCS must submit to the
Secretary of Defense an evaluation of the performance of
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that officer as a member of the Joint Staff and in other
Joint duty assignments.
C. JOINT OFFICER MANAGEMENT
1. Major Sections of Title IV
Title IV of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of
Defense Reorganization Act is entitled Joint Officer
Management. Most of Title IV's legislation was
incorporated into Chapter 38 of the United States Code,
Title 10. This section will summarize the Title IV
legislation and briefly discuss the three amendments from
the 1988, 1989, and 1990 Authorization Acts. 2
What follows is a brief summary of the major
sections of Title IV, Joint Officer Management:
661 - Management Policies for Joint Specialty Officers
662 - Promotion Policy Objectives for Joint Officers
663 - Education
664 - Length of Joint Duty Assignments
665 - Procedures for Monitoring Careers of Joint
Officers
666 - Reserve Officers riot on the Active Duty List
667 - Annual Report to Congresa
The scope and complexity of Title TV becomes
apparent when viewing the detailed requirements outlined in
the law and its three subsequent amendments. In fact,
2The details of the legislation &nd amendments are
available in Public Law U9-433, 100-180, 100-456, and 101-
189.
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Senator Sam Nunn (Democrat, Georgia) who succeeded Senator
Barry Goldwater (Republican, Arizona) as SASC Chariman,
said "the Senate would have to 'very carefully' monitor
implementation of the new law", and added that "we may very
well have to make some changes next year (1987)" [Ref.
11:21].
661 - Management Policies for Joint Specialty
Officgrs
The Secretary of Defense is responsible for
establishing policies, procedures, and practices for the
effective management of officers who are particularly
trained and oriented toward joint matters. These officers
will be identified as joint specialists in addition to
their primary military occupational specialty. An example
of the identifications currently used by the Navy is shown
in Table V. The Navy created Additional Qualification
Designators (AQD) to track each ofticer's experience in
joint matters. The eight AQDs used by the Navy essentially
identify Joint Professional Military Education, Joint Duty
Assignment, and occupational experience levels to assist
with personnel assignment management.
The Secretaries of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and
Marine Corps nominate officers for the Joint Specialty.
However, the Secretary of Defense with the advice of the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff actually selects
officers for the joint specialty. This section dictates
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TABLE V NAVY JOINT SPECIALTY ADDITIONAL QUALIFICATION
DESIGNATORS
JS1: Currently awarded for full joint professional
militaiy education to graduates of either the National War
College or Industrial College of the Armed Forces.
JS2: Indicates full credit for completion of a joint duty
assignment.
JS3: JPME JSO nominee. Has completed JPME. Has graduated
from a full JPME institution or completed both Phase I and
Phase II. Has been designated as a nominee for the purpose
of filling certain billets on the JDAL.
JS4: COS JSO nominee. A Critical Occupational Specialist
officer (not JPME graduate) who is designated as a nominee
to be eligible for Joint duty billets.
JS5: JSO. Has completed the JPME and joint duty assign-
ment requirements of the law; selected by the annual Navy
JSO selection board: designated by the Secretary of
Defense.
JS6: Joint Equivalency Assignment credit. Prior to 1
October 1989, joint duty credit was given to fulfill
requirement of having joint duty credit prior to promotion
to 0-7.
JS7: JPME graduate from Phase I. Phase I schools include
all senior and intermediate level courses at the service
colleges after January 1990.
JSS: JPME graduate from Phase II. Has graduated from
Armed Forces Staff College after July 1990.
Source: "Perspective", September-October 1990 (Ref. 10:2]
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that an officer "nominated for the joint specialty may not
be selected for the joint specialty until the officer:
1) succeasfully completes an appropriate program at a
Joint professional military education school; and
2) after completing such program of education,
successfullly completes a full tour of duty in ajoint duty assignment.
Officers who have a critical occupational specialty
(see Table III) involving combat operations may be
nominated for the joint specialty when initially assigned
to a joint duty assignment. Additionally, the Secretary of
Defense is to ensure that approximately one-half of the
Joint duty assignments positions are filled at any time by
officers who have ths joint specialty or who have been
nominated for the Joint Specialty. Not fewer than one
thousand joint duty assignment positions shall be
designated critical--meaning the officer in that position
must be particularly trained in, and oriented toward, joint
matters.
After January 1, 1994, ail the critical joint
billets must be filled by officers who qualify as joint
specialists. The Secretary of Defense has the authority to
waive many of the criteria throughout the Act for the "good
of the service" and other reasons. Additionally, the
Secretary is responsible for establishing career guidelines
for the selection, military education, training, types of
duty assignmente, and such other matters considered
appropriate for JSOs.
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662 - Promotion Policy Objectives fgr JoinZ
There are three basic criteria for promotion policy
objectives:
1) Current and prior Joint Staff officers are
expected, as a group, to be promoted to the next
higher grade equal to or above the rate for
officers of the same armed force in the same grade
and competitive category as the headquarters staff
mf their armed force.
2) Joint Specialty officers are expected, as a group,
to be promoted not less than the rate of officers
in the same grade and competitive category as the
headquarters staff of their armed force.
3) Officers serving in joint duty assignments are
expected, as a group, to be promoted to the next
higher pay grade at a rate not less than the rate
for all officers of the same force in the same
grade and competitive category. Periodic reports
to Congress are required for the promotional
categories.
663 - Education
Section 663 requires officers selected for
promotion to general and flag rank to attend a military
education course designed specifically to prepare them to
work with other armed forces. The Secretary of Defense,
with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, is to periodically review and revise the
curricula of joint professional military education schools
to enhance the education and training of officers in joint
matters. The schools are to strengthen the focus on a)
joint matters and b) preparing officers for joint duty
assignments. Additionally, the schools will maintain
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rigorous standards for the military education of Joint
Specialty Officerr..
Each Toint Specialty Officer who graduates from the
Industrial College of the Armed Forces and the National
Defense University must be assigned to a Joint Duty
Assignment for that officer's next duty. Additionally, a
high proportion (greater than 50 percent) of the other
officers graduating from the service JPME schools must also
be assigned to joint duty for their next assignment.
F64 - Le -th of Joint Duty Assignments
This section legislates that general officers joint
duty assignments shall not be less than 2 years (originally
3 years) and other officers joint duty assignments shall
not be less than 3 years (orilginally 3 1/2 years). Again,
the Secretary of Defense has waiver authority. officers
categorized with Critical Occupational Specialties (see
Table III) may be assigned less thar 3 yc.rs, but not less
than two years.
Officers that retire, are released from active
duty, suspended, or r~assig'-ed to other qualified positions
may be excluded from calculating tour lengths averages used
for reporting progress to Congress. Additionally, shorter
overseas tours and subsequent joint duty assignment tours
are not included. Services may only exclude 12.5 percent
of all joint duty assignments for COS tours.
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665 - Procedures for Monitoring Careers of Joint
Qfficers
The Se.retary of Defense will establish procedures
fur overseeing the careers of officers with the joint
specialty and officers assigned in joint duty assignments.
The Joint Staff will monitor the promotions and career
assignments of officers with the joi.,t specialt'j and
officers afvigned in joint duty assignments. Additioznally,
the Joint Staff will advise the Chairman on joint personnel
matters.
k--n Reserve Officers not on the Act ve-duty List
Policies fo.1- reserve officers not on the active-
duty list will be establiqhed by the Secretary of Defense
similar to the policies for the active forces. Personnel
policies will emphasize education and experience in joint
matters for the reserve officers.
667 - Annual Report to Congress
This section of the law requires the Secretary of
Defense to include joint duty information in his annual
report to Congress. The report will include information
not only from the Department of Defense, as a whole, but
also separat'l.y for the Army, Navy, Air Force, and M&rine
Corps. The Secretary of Defense will include in the annual
Report of the Secretary to Congress a detailed report on
the implementation of Title IV. The Appendix is a copy of
the 1990 report to the Congress. A brief summary of some
of the required report items is included below:
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1) the number of officers selected for the joint
specialty and their education and experience.
2) the critical occupational specialties and
identification of those for which there is a severe
shortage of trained officers.
3) The above zone, in zone, and below zone promotion
rates for officers on the Joint Staff( Joint
Specialty Officers, officers serving in joint duty
assignments, all officers, and officers serving on
the service headquarters staffs.
4) Average tour length of duty in joint assignments
for:
a) general and flag officers, and
b) other officers.
Both categories shown separately for the Joint
Staff and other JDAs.
5) The number of times and categories waiver authority
was exercised.
6) Analysis of critical positions not filled by JSCs
by:
a) organization,
b) explanation of reasons positions were not
filled with Joinc specialists, and
c) percentage of critical joint duty positions
filled by JSOs.
2. 1987 Amendments (Public Law 100-180)
The "National Defense Authorizatin Act for Fiscal
Years 1988 and 1989" contained five sections with
amendments related to Title IV of the Goldwater-Nichols
Reorganization Act. The Sections art.:
13C1. Nominatior. and selection of officers for the
joint spevialty.
1302. Joint duty assignment positiors.
1303. Length of joint duty assignments.
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1304. Notice to Congress of use of waiver authorities
and exclusions with respect to officer
management.
1305. Special transition rules for nuclear propulsion
officers.
These amendments further deline criteria for
designation of Critical Occupational Specialties, the
secretary of Defense waiver authority, minimum Joint Duty
Assignment tour length requirements, and detailed
exclusions from tour length calculation, and joint duty
credit for reporting purposes. The services' ability to
fill fifty percent of the Joint Duty Assignment positions
with Joint Specialists was broadened by allowing JSO
nominees to fill positions. Several additional reporting
requirements were added to include categorie! of COS
officers nominated and qualified for the Joint Specialty
and comparing promotion rates above zone, in zone, and
below zone for several categories of officers.
Additionally, detailed transitional plans for nuclear
propulsion officers were outlined with the Title IV
transition period extended until 1992 for nuclear qualified
officers. [Ref. 12]
3. 1988 Amendments (Public Law 100-456)
The "National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal
Year 1989" has nine sections on Joint Officer Personnel
Policy. The sections are:
511. Waiver authority with respect to selection of
officers for the joint specialty.
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512. Joint specialty officers in critical joint duty
assignments.
513. Promotion policy objectives for officers with thejoint specialty.
514. Length of joint duty assignments.
515. Additional transition provisions for
implementation of prerequisite for promotion to
initial flag and general officer grade.
516. Extension of transition to joint duty assignment
staffing requirements.
517. Counting of officers with critical occupational
specialty involving combat operations for
purposes of joint duty assignment staffing and
tour lengths.
518. Service by captains and Navy lieutenants in joint
duty assignment to be counted for all officer
personnel laws concerning such service.
519. Technical amendments.
One of the most influential amendments was section
514. This amendment changed the JDA tour length requir-
ement from three and one-half years to three years, and
from three years to two years for flag/general officers.
Section 515 extended the nuclear qualified officers
transition for two more years--until 1994. The Title IV
implementation transition period for all military depart-
ments was extended until October 1, 1989 by section 516.
The other sections clarified or adjusted other provisions
of Title IV to help with determining categories or eligi-
bility and reporting requirements. [Ref. 13]
4. 1989 Amendments (Public Law 101-189)
The "National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Years 1990 and 1991" included legislation on Joint
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Professional Military Education (JPME). Section 1123 of
this Act discusses "Professional Military Education in
Joint Matters". Professional Military Education improve-
ments were lauded and the two-phase approach to JPME was
outlined here. The Statement of Congressional Policy,
Section 1123(b) explained the sequenced approach to joint
education and emphasized the requirement to complete Phase
I education prior to Phase I1. Furthermore, reporting
requirements were included as oversight measures to ensure
compliance with the two-phase JPME sequencing. [Ref. 14]
D. IMPLEUENTATION PROGRESS
Each of the military departments has taken steps to
integrate and implement the Title IV requirments into their
career planning and officer assignment procedures. Since
the enactment of the law, the Office of the Secretary of
Defense has published several policy guidance memoranda and
is currently working on a comprehensive DOD directive.
Several memoranda have been issued to provide policy
guidance for the Services to help them begin implementing
requirements of the legislation. The Joint Staff has also
published JCS Admin Pub 1.2, "Joint Officer Management", to
describe the law and implementation policy guidance. A
soon to be published study on Joint Officer Management was
conducted by the Joint Staff, with the cooperation and
assistance -f each of the military departments.
Additionally, ea Joint Duty Assignment Management
Information System (JDAMIS) has been established for data
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collection to ensure compliance and to meet the various
Congressional reporting requirements. JDAMIS, which is
scheduled to be functional in 1990-1991, is currently being
tested and evaluated for validity.
The General Accounting Office (GAO), at the request of
Congress, has conducted several reviews of various aspects
of the impact or implementation of Title IV. Reviewing the
research areas and their results helps to evaluate how
Title IV in being implemented by the Services.
In June 1988, the GAO produced a Congressional briefing
report entitled, "Impact of Joint Duty Tours on Officer
Career Paths." The report had been generated in response
to DOD legislative proposals to Title IV to modify tour
lengths. The report compared the various lengths of time
officers spent in key "war-fighting positions" 3 and "non-
war-fighting positions". The report attempts to determine
if an officer's career path has enough "non-war-fighting
position" time to accomodate joint tours. The results
state that Navy and Marine officers in field grades spend
an average of 8.2 out of 16 years and 9.6 out of 15 years
in "non-war-fighting positions", respectively. Con-
sequently, the conclusion was that there is enough time to
do a 4.5 year JPME/JDA tour. [Ref. i5:pausim]
3War-fighting positions are defined as follows: Army--
division, brigade, battalion, and company level "saign-
mentay Air Force--wing and squadron level assiqnments;
Marine Corps--fleet marine force assignments; and Navy--
sea duty and major shore commands.
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Army and Air Force officers spend less time in "non-
war-fighting positions" as shown in Table VI.
This comparative table shows that the Army and Air Force
field grade officers are most pressed to accomodate joint
tours. The Air Force had the lowest amount of time in non-
war-fighting assignments (averaging 6.3 years) followed by
TABLE VI FIELD GRADE EXPERIENCE OF GENERAL OFFICERS(FIGURES IN AVERAGE YEARS)
MARINE AIR
CATEGORY ARMY CORPS FORCE NAVY
War-fighting
assianments 6.0 5.4 6.6 7.8
Non-war-fighting
annignmentm 7.6 9.6 6.3 9.2
Field grade total 13.6 15.0 12.9 16.0
Maximum period of
consecutive non -war
fighting assignmgnts 3.9 9.2 3.4-- 2..6.
Source: GAO report of June 1988, "Impact of Joint Duty
Tours on Officer Career Paths" [Ref. 11:5]
the Army (averaging 7.6 years). The report does not
address, however, what the effect might be on community
career path structures. Further analysis by community data
could be conducted to determine if a deterioration of war-
fighting skills or operational shortages would result from
the 3 to 4 years required for completing JPME and JDA.
[Ref. 15:passim]
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In April 1989, the GAO produced a congressional
briefing report entitled "Implementation Status of Joint
Officer Personnel Policies". This report examined:
1) the quality of officers assigned to Joint duty,
2) the 7uality of officers selected for the Joint
specialty,
3) the achievement of promotion targets,
4) t h e applicat ion of the Reorganization Act to
reserv•istis,
5) uareer guidance, and
6) efforts undertaken to meet reporting requirements.
(Ref. 16:8]
The results found that th* level of progress in
implementing Title IV varied. Generally, quality officers
were being selected as Joint Specialists and assigned to
joint duty. However, quality differed oy grade and
service. The quality of the Air Force and Navy officers
was criticized. Quality was defined by using indicators
commonly used by the services to identify high potential
officers. This included completion of intermediate and
sanor service schools, selection for command, and promotion
at a faster than normal rate. (Ref. 16:passim]
The services were not consistently meeting promotion
targets established by the Act. Shortfalls were common for
promotion to Colonel/Navy Captain, and DOD expressed
concern that these shortfalls may be attributed to assign-
ment practices that occurred prior to the Reorganization
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Act. The issue of Title IV's application to reservists had
not been addressed yet by the Secretary of Defense or the
Service branches.
The military departments have put a lot of effort and
energy into meeting Title IV requirements and integrating
the law into manpower management procedures. Although no
formal directives had been published at that time, the
services have updated career handbooks and the DOD has
issued career guidance memoranda. The services have
devoted considerable effort developing data systems to meet
reporting requirements established by Title IV. The
services and the Office of the Secretary of Defense
indicated that reporting efforts were extensive and costly,
estimating $500,000 to develop the JDAMIS data base.
Furthermore, the report stated "... service data indicate
they have expended over 50,000 manhours at a cost of a
little over $1 million to implement the reporting require-
ments of the Reorganization Act. (Ref. 12:22j"
The DOD Jnint Duty Assignment List was reviewed in a
February 1990 GAO report to determine:
1) whether its pos.tions provided the experience
required by the Goldwater.Nichols Act,
2) how DOD designaved critical positions, and
3) if some non-designated positions in the military
departments provide expurience in the integrated
employment of forces [Ref. 7/:l0].
GAO samplad the designated joint duty positions and found
that 60 percent of the operitional agencies and 42 porcent
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of the positions sampled in support agencies provided joint
operational experience. The study categorized JDAL
positions into one of six categories based on structured
interviews with incumbents in those positions and reviews
of position descriptions. (Ref. 17)
This study concluded that many rositions on the JDAL
provide joint operational experience. Additionally, the
study determined that many in-service, non-deuignated
positions also provide experience in operational matters.
DOD issued guidance that may result in some of these in-
service positions being transferred to other services and
added to the JDAL.
The joint officer management provisions were enacted as
part of the reorganization of the Department of Deferse
which was intended to enhance the country's war-fighting
capability. Implementation has been a slow and occas-
sionally difficult process for the Secretary of Defense and
the services. As these GAO reports have shown, progress is
being made and serious efforts have been extended by the
services to ensure implementation. More changes may need
to be integrated as continued evaluation occurs to improve
the joint officer system.
E. SUMMARY
This chapter has shown the complexity and detailed
requirements of the Title IV legislation. Integrating the
requirments of the law with the personnel management
procedures and the needs of the military services has been
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a challenge for the Armed Forces nanpower planners.
Adjusting to the recent changes involving Joint Profes-
sional Military Education is important for ensuring that
Joint Specialist qualifications are met by the future
leaders of the services. The efforts have beon extensive
by the Joint Staff, the military departments, and Congress
to assist in improving the education and quality of
officers assigned to Joint duty. The next chapter will
look at service specific procedu:es for the selection of
officers for JPME and the Joint Specialty.
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IV. SERVICE SELECTION PROCEDURES
A. OVERVIEW
This chapter outlines the individual service's pro-
cedures for Joint Professional Military Education (JPME)
and Joint Specialty Officer (JSO) selection that will be
used in the analysis of Title IV implementation. First, a
brief discussion of several modeling tools will be pre-
sented. Next, the criteria and selection procedures for
intermediate and senior service scnools for JPME will be
detailed. JSO nomination and designation procedures will
then be presented along with the Joint Duty Assignment List
distribution for each of the services. The chapter
concludes with a discussion of using the Joint Duty
Assignment Management Information System (JDAMIS) for
tracking and reporting JSO and Joint Duty Assignment (JDA)
management requirements.
B. CAREER PATHS AND MODELING TITLE IV IMPLEMENTATION
Several Naval Postgraduate School theses, a number of
service-oriented studies, and a Center for Naval Analysis
Study have examined the impact of various officer flows
given the requirements of Title IV of the Goldwater-Nichols
Reorganization Act. These flow models serve as tools for
manpower managers to evaluate effects of various personnel
changes, to forecast the impact of the legislation on
warfare communities, 3nd to assist by providing decision-
making information for implementing and monitoring the
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impact of Joint Duty Assignment and Joint Specialty Officer
flows.
Professor Paul Milch (1988), the Naval Postgraduate
School, designed a user-interactive personnel flow fore-
casting model, FORECASTER, to analyze the effects of Title
IV on the personnel flow with respect to various career
paths and warfare communities [Ref. 18]. This model has
provided an excellent capability for conducting career path
modeling and analysis. Johnson (1989) used FORECASTER to
analyze the effect of the Goldwater-Nichols Act on the
personnel flow within the Navy's Surface Warfare community.
Johnson's results indicate the FORECASTER model can be used
by community managers as an analytical tool to quanti-
tatively analyze the impacts of policy changes and career
paths [Ref. 19]. Drescher (1989) analyzed the flow within
the Navy's Tactical Aviation Pilot and NFO career paths.
Drescher concluded that completely fulfilling the require-
ments established by the Goldwater-Nichols Act would
increase the number of back-to-back shore tours and lead to
decreased war-fighting skills and operational readiness.
Additionally, the ability of Tactical Aviation to fill its
"fair share" of soft billets would be decreased if all
requirements of Title IV were met. [Ref. 203
Miller (1989) used an interactive computer program,
TITLEIV, to demonstrate the usefulness of this computer
model as an analytical tool for Marine Corps Manpower
Managers. The TITLEIV model was used to provide answers to
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"what if" questions concerning compliance with Titla IV
leglislation. Again, this computer model can be used as a
management tool for analysis of the implementation of Title
IV requirements and career path flows. [Ref. 21]
Cymrot's (1987) Joint Specialist Community Model was
developed for Navy planners to help determine the effect
promotion rates and shifts in Joint Duty Assignments for
0-4, 0-5, and 0-6 grades have on the number of Navy 0-6s
eligible for promotion to 0-7 (Flag Officer). This model
used a LOTUS 1-2-3 spreadsheet format for fills and flow
rates to develop scenarios for evaluating the impact of
Title XV on various policy options. The analysis sugqests
that average billet length, number of National Defense
University graduates, and the availability rate (the
fraction of qualified personnel actually available to fill
billets) are three factors that significantly affect the
nurber of Joint Specialists produced. The effects of
retention ratew and promotion rates on Joint Specialists
pcoduction were smaller. Results from Cymrot's anlalysis
concluded that the model providce useful information for
policy makers and planners to evaluate the effectiveness of
meeting vmrious Title IV requirements. [Ref. 22]
The strength of these models is their ability to help
personnel nanagers determine macro level issues such as the
ability ut the services to meet the requiremsnts of Title
IV, the effects on personnel flows that various policy
actions will cause, and the impact of flow models to
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evaluate "what if" scenarios. Although the models used in
these studies are useful tools for personnel managers to
help forecast and evaluate Title IV effects they are not
necessarily providing optimal forecasting solutions because
they don't account for the criteria for selection and
designation of officers to JPME and JDAs.
A key starting point for JSO designation is the
nomination and selection criteria of officers to establish
the flow through the Joint Speciality designation pipeline.
(see Figure 1). Figure 1 shows the various paths towards
JSO designation. The design is such that JPME should occur
prior to the Joint Duty Assignment, but, as illustrated in
Figure 1, alternative paths are feasible. A methodology
:or the selection and eventual designation and tracking of
Joint Specialists is needed. The service's could be so
involved and diligent in fulfilling the myriad requirements
of Title IV that the right officers are not assigned to the
correct billets at the appropriate time.
The 1990 Defense Authorization Act requires this two-
phased approach to JPME. The two phases of JPME create
several sequencing avenues towards dosignation of the Joint
Specialty. Figure 2 illustrates the four primary paths of
obtaining the JSO designation considering the two-phase
JPME that began in 1990. The recommended sequence is for
at, officer to complete Phase I, followed by Phase II and a
Joint Duty Assignment prior to JSO designation. For COS
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ways. First, a COS officer can be assigned to a JDA before
Phase I and Phase II JPME. The second COS alternative
sequence is direct entry into Phase II JPME, followed by
JDA, and then Phase I JPME. The other JPME sequencing path
is via completion of a Phase I correspondence course,
followed by Phase II JPME, and then completing a JDA.
Although the intent is for officers to first attend the
joint education scho'fl, then serve in a Joint Duty Assign-
ment, the alternative sequencing paths are designed to qive
to the personnel manpower managers more flexibility in
making assignments.
The varicus models previously discussed exist for the
analysis of managing the whole process of implementing the
law; however, the individual officer, his qualifications,
requirements, and career path are unique. For example,
each service manages its officer career path assignments
differently. The Army uses an Officer Personnel Management
System (OPMS) with eight divisions, five of which are
directly concerned with officer development and assign-
ments. These divisions are further divided into 23
branches which represent groupings of officers. The Navy's
manpower management is centered with the Navy Military
Personnel Command (NMPC). NMPC uses 19 primary branches
for career path management and professional development
paths, usually in well defined sea-shore sequences.
The Air Force Personnel Classification System is
designed around career flelds that place officers in
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functional groupings based on similarity of skills
required. Air Force Specialty Codes are also used to group
designated specialists for manpower management purposes.
The Officer Assignment Branch for the Marine Corps main-
tains three primary officer assignment departments. The
personnel monitors of the Various Military Occupational
Specialties make assignments. Some of these primary areas
for officer assignments of each military department are
further subdivided into specific warfare communities for
personnel Aanagerent. The role of the personnel managers
is critical for duty assignments as timing, qualifications,
tour lengths, tour types, and career paths all hinge on the
assignment and selection process.
C. SELECTION FOR JOINT PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION
Joint Professional Military Education is the gateway to
Joint Specialty Officer nomination and selection. The
transition period for Title IV waiver authority to waive
the requirement for either JPME or JDA ended 1 October
1989. As discussed earlier, the selection and eventual
designation of a Joint Specialist requires JPME followed by
completion of a JDA. Officers with Critical Occupational
Specialities (COS) can begin the JSO nomination process by
being assigned to a JDA initially, and then attending JPME,
but this is an exception to the preferred method of
"growing a JSO". Additionally, the Secretary of Defense
can waive the sequence on a case-by-case basis. The
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intent, however, remains first to acquire the joint
perspective from JPME, then serve in the JDA.
Phase I of JPME is taught as part of the resident
curricula of the military service's Intermediate Colleges
or Senior Service schools (see Table VII for listing of
schools). The resident Professiondi Military Education
programs of the National Detense University (National war
College and Industrial College of the Armed Forces) satisfy
both Phase I and Phase II JPME requiremants.
TABLE VII INTERMEDIATE AND SENIOR SERVICE SCHOOLS
Army Command and General Staff Cellege (Ft. Leavenworth,
KS)
Marine Corps Command and Staff College (Quantico, VA)
Air Command and Staff College (Maxwell AFB, AL)
College of Naval Command and Staff (Newport, RI)
Army War College (Carlisle, PA)
College of Naval Warfare (Newport, RI)
Air War College (Maxwell AFB, AL)
National Defense Univeraity:
National War College (Washington, DC)
Inductrial Collage of the Armed Forces (WashJngton, DC)
Armed Forces Staff College (Norfolk, VA)
The Armed Forces Staff College has been redesigned to be
the only Phase IT credit institution. Tho initial Phase II
JPME class began in June 1990.
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Professional Military Education is important to making
a good service officer into a good joint-oriented officer.
Service schools provide joint education from a service
perspective and Joint Schools providol joint education from
a joint perspective. Service schools; goals are to increase
the focus on joint operations and increase officer repre-
sentation from each of the military branches. These goals
emphasize the "socialization or bonding" as well as
increase the exposure to the perceptions and views of
officers from the other military departments. The educa-
tion process is designed to help bridge the officer's
thinking from a service perspective to a joint perspective.
Representative Ike Skelton (Missouri), chairman of the
Study Panel on Military Education, commented on the
Selection standards in a November 19, 1987 speech before
Congress:
.... Each service views professional military education
in a different way. Fo: the Army, attending inter-
mediate and senior )evel military institutions is vital
to the career of the individual officer. In a certain
sense it is a ticket that has to be punched. The
attitude of the Air Force is a somewhat different, less
rigorous one. Though the service does send its beat
officers, the idea is one of education for education's
sake. Traditionally, the Navy has thought it very
important to select an officer to go off to school, be
it the staff college or the war college level. While
important for the individual officer to be selected, it
wns less important that he attend. The servica viewed
as.lection, not necessarily attendance, s the important
consideration for career advancement. As a result, we
have a number of captains and admirals in the Navy in
key positions who have never been to either the
intermediate or senior level course at the Naval War
College. As for the Marine Corps, it joems to combine
the attitudes of the Army and the Navy, an important
ticket to be punched but not necessary for advancement.
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Yet it is important to make sure that since only a
small percentage of the officer corps has the oppor-
tunity to attend the intermediate and senior service
schools that only the best be admitted. ... [Ref.
23:H10649]
Skelton reviewed the Military Education programs for
each of the military departments. One of the results from
his panel's report was the revision of the "Military
Education Policy Document". This May 1990 publication
defines the objectives and policies reqarding the educa-
tional institutions that make up the military education
system of the Armed Forces. The "Military Education Policy
Document" provides both objective. for all Professional
Military Education (PME) programs and specific objectives
for each level. The five levels of military education are
precommisioning, primary intermediate, senior, and
general/flag level. Each level's primary focus is designed
to build upon previously gained knowledge. The impact of
Title IV of the Goldwater-Nichols Act (1986) and the
Skelton Report on Military Education (1989) are evidenced
in the detail that Joint Professional Military Education is
addressed. The entire Professional Military Education
system is now designed as a sequence of educational 7oals
and objectives that are progressive and enhanced at each
level. [Ref. 24]
Each military department must select its PME students
from among its most outstanding officers. In addition,
each service must provide students from a variety of
warfare occupations and specialties. The ratio of students
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from each service should provide balance to enhance thc
joint educational experience at the service Rchools. Table
VIII shows what the student distributions from each
military department at the difforent schools were in 1987-
1988. According to Table VIII the Army has almost 50
percent (1342 of 2885) of all intermediate school seats,
the Air Force filled eG4 seats, the Navy has 399 3eats, and
the Marine Corps used 270 seats. Each milithry service iw




ARMY N(AVY FORCR 3SMC TOTAL
Intermediate Les1v:
Armed Forces Staff College 212 93 146 37 488
Army Command & General Staff 704 3 40 18 765
Naval Command & Staff 32 97 12 21 162
Air Command & Staff 44 13 384 9 450
Marine Corps Command & Staff 12 9 2 123 146
National War College 40 28 40 10 118
Industrial College of
Armed Forces 63 40 62 10 175
Army War College 181 8 17 9 215
College of Naval Warfare 34 98 13 28 173
Air War College 20 10 148 5 183
Total 1342 399 1364 270 2885
Source: Input from colleges [Ref. 8:76)
represented in each school; however, the Navy had only
three and eight officers, respectively, attend the Army
Intermediate and Senior level schools. Also, the Air Force
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had two officers attend the Marine Corps school, and the
Marine Corps sent a combined 14 officers to the Air Force
schools. The National Defense University schools (National
War College, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, and
the Armed Forces Staff College) show better service
representation which subsequently contributes to the
development of their institution'3 educational joint
perspectives.
Table IX compares, by service, the number of
intermediate students with the total number of majors/Navy
TABLE IX OFFICERS IN INTERMEDIATE PROFESSIONAL MILITARY
EDUCATION (ACADEMIC YEAR 1987-1988)
SERVICE Number of Total Number Percentage
Intermediate of Majors/Navy Intermediate
PME Students Lieutenant Students of
Commanders Total 0-42(0-4s)
ARMY 1004 16,791 6.0
NAVY 215 13,614 1.6
AIR FORCE 584 19,615 3.0
MARINE CORPS 208 3,214 6.5
Source: Student numbers from schools. Number of
majors/Navy lieutenant commanders from "DOD Military
Manpower Statistics" September 30, 1988. [Ref. 8:114]
lieutenant commanders (O-4s) that attended intermediate
service schools in 1987-1988. The Army sends the most
students (1004) and the Marine Corps sends the highest
relative percentage of students (6.5 percent) based on this
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annual observation. Except for the Marine Corps, the Navy
sends both fewer officers (215) and a lower percentage of
officers (1.6 percent) to intermediate schools. Table IX
also illustrates the rarity of the opportunity for 0-4s to
attend intermediate PME in 1987-1988 ranging from 1.6
percent of the Navy's 0-4 population to only 6.5 percent
for the Harine Corps. The Air Force sent only three
percint and the Army only six percent of their 0-4
population to intermediate school.
Although the opportunity to attend PME is a rare event,
nearly 3000 U.S. Military officers were assigned to attend
Professional Military Education at the Intermediate or
Senior level in aoademic year 1987-1908 (see Table X). The
Army clearly places a high priority on PME attendance with
1,342 officers receiving the opportunity to attend.
Another item in Table X worthy of mention is that the
Navy's attendance at senior schools (184 students) is
almost equal to their intermediate school level (215
students). The E.iay's senior school enrollment represents
46 percent of all PME seats tilled by the Navy. All of the
other services "send far fewer officers to senior school
than intermediate schools. The percentages of senior
school fills relative to total PME fills are 338/1342 (25
percent) for the Army, the Air Force has 280/864 (32
percent), the Marine Corps hac 62/270 (23 percent). These
differences indicate an increased emphasis by the Navy on
the importeince of senior level schools.
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1. PHE Selection Processes
The selection process to choose and assign these
officers is a critical component of the Joint Specialty
designation process. A look at how each of the services
select high quality officers to attend JPME is important.
The intermediate level school is targeted to career
TABLE X ANNUAL PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION ENROLLMENT
(ACADEMIC YEAR 1987-1988)
SERVICE Intermediate Senior Total
School School
ARMY 1,004 338 1,342
NAVY 215 184 399
AIR FORCE 584 280 864
MARINE CORPS 208 62 270
TOTAL 2,011 864 2,875
Source: Service Schools [Ref. 8:150]
officers with 10 to ý.4 years experience and the senior
level is aimed at the officers with 15 to 23 years of
experience. The variance among the service's selection and
assignment process will now be examined.
&RMY- The Army promotion system regards the
completion of professional military education as critical.
Army officers are screened by a board of officers for
selection to attend Professional Military Education.
The Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel approves the
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boards results. Assignment officers then send those
officers selected to the appropriate intermediate school.
Attending intermediate or senior level school iz
perceived to be a prerequisite for increased rank in the
Army structure. Promotability is, therefore, a key
selection criterion. In fact, the Skelton Report stated
that Army officers selected for intermediate PME were the
top 40-50 percent of the majors. Similarly, the top 20
percent of lieutenant colonels and colonels were selected
for senior level schools.
Majors not selected for intermediate PME must
complete the Command and General Staff Officers Course by
correspondence as a prerequisite for promotion to
lieutenant colonel. Failure to complete the Command and
General Staff College (resident or non-resident) virtually
assures non-selection to lieutenant colonel for Army line
officers. Additionally, the critical importance of senior
service school attendance is evidenced by the Army's
General officer's high correlation rate between General
officers and senior school attendance. Almost all (98
percent) of the Army's serving generals had completed
Senior service college.
Of all the services, the Army sends the most
officers to both intermediate and senior PME. The
importance of PME on an Army officer's career path makes
selection highly competitive. Officer Personnel Management
Directorate (OPMD) of the Army OPMS manages officer
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assignments in the branch and functional areas. The OPMD
assigns selected officers to attend PME using a priority
distribution model. The PME graduates fill key positions
in the Army structure, as well as Joint Duty Assignments.
The promotion and JPME criteria of Title IV are easily
integrated into the Army's PME selection and assignment
process.
- Navy officer selection criteria for
intermediate and senior professional military education is
detailed in OPNAVINST 1301.8. Officers are selected to
attend service college as an adjunct to the promotion board
in which they are in-zone for lieutenant commander
(Intermediate school) and commander (Senior school). In
1988, the Navy qualified 69 percent of the lieutenant
commander selectees, 80 percent of the commander selectees,
and 100 percent of the captain selectees for Professional
Military Education. Th Navy reduces ratio of the number
qualified to the number assigned by having Navy Personnel
officers make assignment selections from the pool of
eligible officers. Additionally, officers may be selected
for Service college attendance by requesting administrative
screening through their assignment detailers.
The Service College Selection Boards consider
sustained superior performance as a primary crJterion for
selection. Selectees x.,main on thi S6.-vi.e college
selection list for several years and are assiqned as
student- ',iring appropriate times in their career paths.
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The Navy has some unique difficulties in having its
officers attend PME because of requirements to keep ships
at sea, submarine safe, aviators qualified, and so on.
Unlike the other services, the Navy operates in its war-
fighting environment routinely and maintains a constantly
high demand for top quality officers to fill many critical
service billets. Furthermore, the Navy also has many
officers attending graduate education programs at this
juncture in their careers. This creates additional
competition for high quality officers between JPME and the
technical and non-technical graduate education needs.
Former Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Trost,
responded to the S3,elton Study panel inquiry on the
selection process with this summary:
The personnel process which results in the
assignment of officers to specific schools considers
the officer's profossional development needs, personal
preferences and desires, billet requirements, personal
credentials, career timing, Navy manning needs, and
available quvtam. We place great emphasis on the
quality of our officers in the schools of the Sister
Services. A f1sig officer approval is made of every
nominee to att~end service college. This assures a
strong candidate is assigned to all our available
quotas ... r[Ref. 25: 1308-1309]
AIR - The Air Force employs a three step
selection process. First, eligibility to attend PME is
determined fror the promotion board selection process.
Second, the promotion boards reconvene to determine the
school nomination list. Approximately 32 percent of the
majors and 15 percent of the lieutenant colonels are
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nominated. The third step is selection by an intermediate
or senior school designation board comprised of colonels
and generals. The board decides PME school assignments
based on the result of a complete review of the military
records of the officers selected.
MARINE CORPS - Selection for intermediate and
senior service school for Marine Corps officers is
initiated by officer assignment monitors. Quality of
performance and availability of transfer are key indicators
for the monitors to recommend officers for intermediate
schools. The Marine Corps Director of Personnel Management
approves the selections. Intermediate service school
assignments are recommended by the officer's assignment
monitor.
Senior school selection, based on qualifications
and availability, is competitive with all lieutenant
colonel records screened for attendance. The results of
the screening are reviewed and approved by the Commandant
of the Marine Corps.
General Al Gray responded to the Skelton Study
panel inquiry about selection criteria for the officers
attending PME by stating:
As to school assignments, the best officers
aYaUe are selected to attend PME. The quality of
an officer's record and his promotability are the
principal criteria for assignment to PME. (Ref. 25:
1365)
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A renewed emphasis on the study of war-fighting
skills has been pushed by the Commandant of the Marine
Corps. Therefore, enrollment in the appropriate Non-
resident Professional Military Education course is now
required for all officers.
D. JOINT SPECIALTY OFFICER NOMINATION AND DESIGNATION
The Joint Chiefs of Staff have issued policy guidance
and implementation procedures about JSO nomination and
designation procedures to the services via memoranda and
the publication of JCS Admin Pub 1-.. A Joint Officer
Management Program Directive is being completed by the
Joint Staff detailing the policy guidance for implementing
the provisions of Title IV of the Goldwater-Nichols Act.
Additionally, thb Joint Staff, in cooperation with each of
the military departments, is completing a study on joint
officer management initiatives.
The transition period (1986-1989) contained many
aveaues toward the JSO designation with multiple
exceptions, exeldptions, and qualification criteria. The
services have conducted JSO designation boards using the
precepts and policy guidance the JCS memoranda established.
The 30 September 1989 summary of officers awarded the JSO
designation is presented in Table XI. The Army has
qualified the most officers (6,660) and the Air Force has
qualified the most General/Flag officers (309). The
distribution shown in Table XI shows that the Army has 38
percent of the 17,489 designated JSOs, while the Army
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composes 32 percent of the 0-4 and above officers in DOD.
The Navy's 3,708 JSOs represent 21 percent of the
designated JSOs, but compose 26.3 percent of the DOD's
field grade and above officers. The Air Force has 5,706
TABLE XI JOINT SPECIALTY OFFICER SELECTION AS OF 1 OCTOBER
1989
SERVICE 0-4 TO 0-6 General/Flag Total
Officers
ARMY 6,455 205 6:660
NAVY 3,473 235 3,708
AIR FORCE 5,397 309 5,706
MARINE CORPS 1,345 70 1,415
DEPARTMENT OF 16,670 819 17,489
DEFENSE
Source: Joint Staff, J-1
JSOs (33 percent of the 17,489) and they represent 37.3
percent of the DOD's officers. Finally, the Marine Corps'
1,415 JSOs represent eight percent of the JSO population
and 5.5 percent of the DOD 0-4 and above population.
Each of the military departments is now responsible for
ensuring that it develops a cadre of Joint Specialists and
keeps them competitive with their non-JSO counterparts.
This is to be done without causing significant
deterioration of war-fighting skills or personnel shortages
in the operational fields.
7
Joint Specialty Officers are to be experts in their own
service as a primary requirement for designation. There-
fore, professional excellence in service performance and
demonstrated superior performance in a occupational
specialty are important criteria. One of the fundamental
objectives of designating JSOs is to continue developing
officers whose professional backgrounds coupled with joint
education provide increased operational excellence in joint
operations.
The Program for Joint Professional Military Education
(PJE) is the body of principles and conditions that
prescribe the course goals and learning objectives for
officer JPME programs at the Intermediate and Senior level
of military education. PJE is designed to:
1) Ensure that all students at PME colleges are
knowledgeable in joint matters.
2) Prepare students for Joint Duty Assignments.
3) Satisfy the educational requirements for JSO
nomination. [Ref. 24:111-1]
The Armed Forces Staff College conducts a Joint
Transition Course (JTC) approximately one week long to help
prepare direct entry officers (officers who directly enter
Phase II JPME without having completed Phase I JPME) for
the Phase II intermediate joint level education.
The "Military Education Policy Document" lists four
approved sequences for JSO designation to accomodate
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Service operational requirements and personnel management
limitations (see also Figure 2). The sequences are:
1) Recommended Seauence. PJE Phase I, PJE Phase II,
JSO nomination, joint duty assignment, JSO
designation.
2) Critical Occupational SMecialist Alternative 1.Jso nomination, joint duty assignment, PJE Phase I,
PJE Phase II, JSO designation.
3) Critical Occugational Specialist ALternative 2(CJCS Waiver ReQuired). Joint Transition Course,
PJE Phase II (direct entry), JSO nomination, joint
duty assignment, PJE Phase I, JSO designation.
4) Nonresident Seauesce. An Accredited PJE Phase I
nonresident program, PJE Phase II, JSO nomination,joint duty assignment, JSO designation.
On a limited case-by-case basis, the Secrotary of
Defense may waive the JPME requirement if the officer
has completed two full JDAs. [Ref. 24:111-2, 111-3]
The sequences for JSO designation are designed to
adhere to the intent of the initial Title IV legislation,
and the subsequent amendments. Furthermore, a Statement of
Congressional Policy was issued on 6 Noverber, 1989 as
follows:
As part of the efforts of the Secretary of Defense
to improve professional military education, Congress
urges, as a matter of policy, and fully expects theSecretary to establish the following: 1) A coherent
and comprehensive framework for the education of
officers, including officers nominated for the joint
specialty. ) A two-phase approach to strengthening
the focus on joint matters, as follows:
a) Phase I instruction consisting of a joint
curriculum, in addition to the principal
curriculum taught to all officers at service-
operated professional military education
schools.
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b) Phase II instruction consisting of
a follow-on, solely joint curriculum taught at
the Armed Forces Staff College to officers who
are expected to be selected for the joint
specialty. The curriculum should emphasize
multiple "hands on" exercises and must
adequately prepare students to perform
effectively from the outset in what will
probably be their first exposure to a totally
new environment, as assignment to a joint,
multiservice organization. Phase II
instruction should be structured so that
students progress from a basis knowledge ofjoint matters learned in Phase I to the level
of expertise necessary for successful
performance in the joint arena.
3) A sequenced approach to joint education in which
the norm would require an officer to complete Phase I
instruction before proceeding to Phase II instruction.
An exception to the normal sequence should be granted
by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff only on a
case-by-case basis for compelling cause. Officers
selected to receive such an exception should be
required to demonstrate a basic knowledge of joint
matters and other aspects of the Phase I curriculum
that qualifies them to meet the minimum requirements
established for entry into Phase II instruction without
first completing Phase I instruction. The number of
officers selected to attend an offering of the prin-
cipal course of instruction at the Armed Forces Staff
College who have not completed Phase I instruction
should comprise only a small portion of the total
number of officers selected. [Ref. 26:S14779-S14780]
The above Statement f Congressional Policy is
incorporated in the "Military Education Policy Document"
and the JSO designation process. The two-phase JPME policy
and the limited number of direct entry officsrs into Phase
II are ways the military departments are complying with the
intent of Title IV.
A 1987 memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense,
William H. Taft IV, included detailed nomination and
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selection procedures for the Joint Specialty. Secretary
Taft's Memorandum specified that the military departments
were responsible for nominating officers for the Joint
Specialty. Nominations are to be made from among officers
who are senior captains (or Navy lieutenants) or who are
serving in a higher grade. The military departments are to
notify the Director of the Joint Staff, Office of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Military Manpower and Personnel Policy, Office
of Assistant Secretary of Defense, (Force Management and
Personnel), of all officers designated as nominees.
The recommendations for selection of officers for award
of the Joint Specialty are forwarded to the Secretary of
Defense for approval. The Chairman of Joint Chiefs of
Staff and Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management
and Personnel), in turn, are included in the routing to the
Secretary of Defense. Performance records for officers
recommended for JSO designation are expected to be of the
same overall quality as officers selected for assignment to
Service headquarters staff.
Implementing Title IV during the initial development
period combined with the variotis pathways to the Joint
Specialty award has led to the development of Joint
Specialty Officer Eligibility Criteria. The Joint
Specialty Qualification status identifies various types of
JPME and JDA completions. An officer may have completed
both JPME and JDA; or only completed JIME or JDA; or
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completed a JDA first, then JPME. These various categories
allowed different types of JSO qualifications to occur and
must be identified. Table XII summarizes the various
categories used for monitoring and tracking Joint
Spncialists with the JDAMIS automation.
TABLE XII JOINT SPECIALTY QUALIFICATION STATUS CODES
CATEGORY JOINT EXPERIENCE
A JPME then full JDA tour
B Full JDA tour only
C 2 Year JDA only (COS only)
D Less than Full JDA
E JPME only
F Full JDA then JPME
G Less than full JDA, then JPKE
H JPME then less than full JDA
J JPME then 2 years JDA COS
Source: JDAMIS
The size and composition of Joint Duty Assignment List
(JDAL) is a key factor in determining how many officers are
needed for JPME and how many oificers are needed as Joint
Specialists. As previously stated, fifty percent of the
JDAL billets are to be filled by JSOs or JSO nominees that
have completed JPME, or COS officers. Additionally, eighty
percent of the critical billets are to be filled by JSOs or
JSO nominees--the fill requirement becomes 100
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percent for che critical billets in 1994. Table XIII
identifies the total number of Joint Duty positions on the
1990 JDAL by service and rank.
These billets are distributed as shown in Table XIII to
the military departments with 3234 (36 percent) for the
Army, 1855 (21 percent) for the Navy, 3315 (37 percent) for
the Air Force, and 489 (6 percent) for the Marine Corps.
So with about 9000 billets, approximately one-half (or
4500) of the JDAL positions must be filled with JSOs, a JSO
nominee that has completed JPME, or COS officer (limited to
25 percent). To meet the 50 percent requirement,
approximately 3.75 (37.5 percent) of the officers assigned
to the JDAL must be filled with graduates of JPME since
1125 (12.5 percent) may be filled by COS officers that have
not yet attended JPME. Furthermore, 820 (or 80 percent) of
the 1025 critical billets must be filled with JSOs and this
requirement becomes 100 percent in 1994. Positions
identified as critical Jcint Duty assignments, meaning "the
officer should be particularly trained in and oriented
toward joint matters", are shown in Table XIV.
Each of the service's personnel managers must manage
these JDAL and critical positions to the "billet level".
This requires officer assignment personnel to plan and
examine individual qualifications for a particular billet
and not simply send an officer to an organization for the
command to place in an appropriate billet. Each
organization, in turn, has JDAL positions, critical JDAL
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TABLE X.III 1990 JOINT DUTY ASSIGNMENT LIST BY
SERVICE AND RANK
QA 05 i 07-01 TOTA
ARMY 1120 1404 618 97 3239
NAVY 620 765 4C4 66 1855
AIR FORCE 1222 1360 640 93 3315
MARINE CORPS 185 216 73 15 489
DOD TOTAL 3147 3745 1735 280 8907
Source: Joint Staff, J-1
TABLE XIV 1990 CRITICAL OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY (COS)
BILLETS ON THE JOINT DUTY ASSIGNMENT LIST
05 i 067-010 TOTA
ARMY 185 186 19 390
NAVY 74 104 14 192
AIR FORCE 187 175 19 381
MARINE CORPS 30 29 3 62
DOD TOTAL 476 494 55 1025
Source: Joint Staff, J-1
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positions, and non-JDAL position requirements that the
services' personnel managers must fill. Operational
requirements, officer availability, timing constraints, and
service billet requirements all contribute to a complicated
personnel management task. This billet level management
requires more "micro-management" for the services' officer
assignment personnel.
The Joint Staff is responsible for the management and
control of the Joint Duty Assignment List. Specified and
Unified Commands submit requests for adjustments and
changes to the JDAL frequently. These requests include
additions, deletions, specific service or rank requests,
and billet adjustments or requirements. While numerous
changes have occurred with the JDAL during the last four
years, the list of Joint Duty Assignments, as a whole, has
remained generally constant. Figure 3 shows the trends of
the composition of the JDAL by service and rank.
Basically, the total number of billets on the JDAL have
increased and relative ratios between the four service
Departments have remained constant. Critical billet trends
are displayed in Figure 4. Again, a slight increase in the
total size of the critical billets and stable service
ratios are evident.
E. JOINT DUTY ASSIGNMENT MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM
(JDAMIS)
The Joint Duty Assignment Management Information System
(JDAMIS) is another important tool for tracking, monitoring
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and reporting Joint Specialty Officer and Joint Duty
Assignment information. The Secretary of Defense, in
conjunction with the Joint Staff, developed the management
information system using service input and the resources of
the Defense Manpower Data Center (DKDC). The first
centralized automated report is scheduled for 1990.
Each military department is responsible for maintaining
and updating their service's information for the JDAMIS
data base. Service-generated reports are also available
using the JDAMIS data base. The Joint Staff and the
individual service departments will decrease the manhours
required for report preparation when the JDAMIS rceporting
system is validated. JDAMIS can generate reports such as:
1) JSO and JSO Nominees designated;
2) Assignment of Officers Following JSO Designation;
3) Summary of Critical Occupational Specialties;
4) JDAs Excluded From Tour Length Averaging;
5) Average Tour Lengths;
6) Frequency of Waiver Usage;
7) JDAL Distribution and JDA Billet Fill Status.
Many of the required report summaries shown in the
Appendix can be produced by JDAMIS. Again, JDAMIS will not
make decisions about quality and selection of JSOs, but the
information system is a tool for assisting personnel




This chapter outlined the individual services'
procedures for JPME and JSO selection. Some of the
modeling tools available to assist policy and manpower
planners were discussed. These models are designed to help
with analysis of the impact of particular policies
regarding Title IV implementation. The service selection
procedures for JPME demonstrated the requirements for
promotability and high quality input used by each military
department. The JSO nomination and selection process
linked with JPME sequencing and the size and composition of
the JDAL was also presented.
The complexity of managing officers to the billet level
for the JDAL was outlined. JPME requirements to meet the
Joint Duty Assignment List size and composition of critical
and non-critical billets demands micro-management by the
services' personnel manpower, planners and assignment
officers. An information system, Joint Duty Assignment
Management Information System is also being developed to
help with the personnel and manpower management tasking.
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V. ANALYSIS OF PROCEDURES
A. OVERVIEW
Manpower management and personnel assignments are
complex and detailed processes that must consider the needs
of the individual officers, the service, and various billet
qualification requirements. Managing the billets and
assignments for Joint Specialty Officers involves matching
individual qualifications with billet requirements and
ensuring that the appropriate education and training
occurs. This chapter analyzes this personnel management
process, specifically, the Joint Professional Military
Education (JPME) and Joint Specialty Officer (JSO) selec-
tion procedures that were presented in Chapter IV. Each
military department's representation on the Joint Duty
Assignment List is also evaluated. A brief discussion of
using the Joint Duty Assignment Information System (JDAMIS)
for Joint Specialty Officer management concludes the
chapter.
B. ANALYSIS OF THE JOINT MANPOWER MANAGEMENT PROCESS
Chapter IV described the selection criteria for Joint
Professional Military Education and designation of the
Joint Specialty. The challenge for personnel managers is
implementing the provisions of Title IV of the 1986
Department of Defense Reorganization Act to meet the intent
of Congress. The Joint officer Management policies must
also be integrated into service personnel management
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systems. A major difficulty in integrating Title IV is
managing Joint Specialists to the billet level. This
billet level management requires assigning appropriately
qualified officers to fill a particular billet with its own
requirements and requisite qualifications instead of
assigning an officer to a command. As a result there is
need for greater personnel "micro-management" in order to
meet mandated objectives and to comply with the myriad
reporting requirements to Congress. Given the level of
"micro-management" required for implementation details, the
law significantly restricts the flexibility of the ser-
vices' personnel management system.
Since the inception of the DOD Reorganization Act, the
Joint Specialists, associated Joint Duty Assignments, and
Joint Professional Military Education are receiving much
greater attention throughout the services. Many of the
Professional Military Education (PME) seats and joint duty
billets have been previously filled by any available
officer. However, the requirements of Title IV mandate
that only quality officers can be sent to fill joint
billets. Quality is difficult to define and quantifyr
essentially, it is defined by previous performance and the
likelihood of potential promotability of an officer. While
the officer corps requires high standards, there is not an
infinite supply of high quality officers. Therefore, the
selection and career management process must ensure both
operational billets and joint billets receive top per-
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formers. Additionally, the requirement for all National
Defense University graduates and greater than fifty percent
of other JPME graduates to be assigned to a joint duty tour
for their next assignment has increaaed the emphasis on the
quantity and quality of officers filling the educational
opportunity billets.
Professional development for many of today's military
officers emphasizes dual development paths in a warfare
occupational specialty (or other support specialty) and in
a subspecialty (or alternate occupational specialty).
Qualification in the primary occupational specialty is
still the foundation upon which each officer establishes
potential future growth and promotability. Furthermore, as
an officer progresses, each military service department has
certain milestones that reflect achievement of standards of
managerial competence and leadership skills which enhance
an officer's opportunity for promotion. However, no single
criterion such as Joint Professional Military Education, a
Joint Duty Assignment, a graduate degree, or a particular
occupational specialty guarantees success in the service.
A blending of these and other career elements will char-
acterize the career patterns of officers who have contrib-
uted effectively to the needs and top leadership positions
of the military services.
To produce officers with the specific qualifications
required for the joint duty assignments that will become
available is indeed complex. The types of operational
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skills required, tour length requirements, limited number
of JPME seats available, and unit rotational cycles all
combine to limit Joint Duty Assignment opportunities. All
these requirements also restrict the personnel managers'
flexibility in making assignments.
Although the JPME school seats have not been considered
as vital to fill as operational units, they are required
for JSO selection and they do help prepare officers for
joint assignments. Additionally, the personnel managers
must consider each officer's individual needs in support of
operational development in order to place that officer into
the most appropriate billet or school at the time in his or
her career when that assignment can best serve both the
service's and officer's needs. JPME is a personal benefit
to individual officers; but, it also represents an
institutional investment in human capital that is increas-
ingly vital. Although operational excellence and main-
taining a force ready for combat remains the priority for
personnel managers, JPME seats also provide an avenue for
the future leadership to develop and acquire valuable
skills.
The selection process for identifying officers to fill
JPME seats does not include identification of a specific
future assignment. This process of selection and eventual
school assignment is a function of individual timing and
availability more than any other factor. There is no
correlation required between military specialties of JPME
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graduates and the specialties required for upcoming vacant
Joint Duty Assignments. For example, a joint intelligance
billet could become vacant in March and no current JPME
graduate may have the skills required to fill the billet.
So. the billet gets filled by a non-JPME graduate or filled
by a graduate without billet matching qualifications, or
the billet is not filled. This particular example is not
unique to Joint Specialists, but the problem is multiplied
by the many requirements of the billets and requisite
officer qualifications.
Personnel managers must manage the officer population
(by branch, division, specialty, etc.) to insure that
officers with the right professional qualifications are
available to match the specific qualificatio~is required for
each Joint Duty Assignment. So, selection for a Joint Duty
Assignment is now a critical milestone in a officer's
career development. This JDA assignment is particularly
critical because it is now required for promotion to 0-7.
Selection to a JDA, however, remains primarily a personnel
management action, as assignment managers must place
officers in vacating billets.
There is no provision in the law to determine pre-
requisite billet qualifications, nor is there a method of
competitive JDA selection. Some billets require specific
ranks or occupational specialties (i.e., an 0-5 intel-
ligence officer), while other billets may or may not be
designated critical billets. The personnel managers must
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attempt to match primary military occupational specialties
(MOS), secondary MOSs, JSO status and critical/non-critical
billets from the available inventory of transferable
officers. Forecasting JDA requirements and integrating
these requirements with JPME selection/assignment process
can help provide appropriately qualified officers to fill
JDA billets. An alternative method of management would be
to change the legislation from a billet level to an
organizational level assignment policy. This policy change
would increase officer assignment flexibility and allow the
commanders of the joint commands to use their JDA officers
in whatever billets were needed to maximize the assigned
officers' utility and the organization's effectiveness.
One of the key factors associated with the number of
officers needed to fill JPME seats and JDAs is the Joint
Duty Assignment List (JDAL). As stated oarlier, fifty
percent of the JDAL may be filled by non-JPME graduates.
However, the law requires greater than fifty percent of the
JPME graduates to be assigned to joint duty. In addition,
eighty percent of the minimum i000 critical billet6 on the
JDAL must be filled with Joint Specialists, JSO nominees,
or COS officers (less than 25 percent). Consequently, the
personnel assignment officers must fill these specific
billets with appropriately educated or qualified officers.
Filling the JDAs and implementing the two-phase JPME
system is a personnel management challenge. The services
are committed to sending as many Phase I graduates as
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possible who are assigned joint duty to Phase I1 education
enroute to their JDA. Other officers will need to receive
Phase II education during or following their JDA tour to
qualify as Joint Specialists. The services are honoring
this commitment of sending Phase I graduates to Phase II by
identifying officers who are recent graduates of resident
services schools, specifically, academic years 1985-1989.
These officers will help form a pool of potential candi-
dates able to attend Phase II JPME. They can be designated
JSO nominees upon completion of the Phase Ii education.
This will allow more officers to progreus toward JSO
designation. This pool will also help the services comply
with the legal mandate to fill the appropriate percentage
of Joint Duty Assignment List billets with JSOs/JSO
nominees. Using the 1985-1989 Service school graduntas for
JPME Phase 1I certification will also reduce the number of
"direct entry" (non-Phase I graduatel students into the
Phase II program.
The two-phase approach to JPME also has several
limitations. First, Phase IT 7PME lacks the capability to
accept all the Phase I graduates prior to their subsequent
JDAs. The Armed Forces Staff College does not have the
capacity in terms of physical facilities or staff to handle
all Phase I graduates. Second, completion of the three-
month Phase II program requires temporary duty enroute or
from the many joint coimiands. This tLree month school is
costly in terms of the command's travel/per diem funding,
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gapped or vacant billets, and the lack of productivity (as
perceived by the present command) of the officer attending
the school.
Third, there is competition from graduate education
programs. Few occupational specialties provide opportunity
for an officer to obtain both fully-funded graduate
education and a one year JPME plus 2-3 year JDA tour. The
JPME system must not be so constructed that it forbids some
of the Armed Forces' best officers from attending graduate
schools. The diversity and utility derived from both the
technical and non-technical graduate programs also con-
tribute to the development of the military's future
leadership. A graduate education can be beneficial, if not
a requirement, for many JDA assignments.
A fourth limitation is the competition for critically
short COS oficers and their requirements tc fill key
servico billets. Some occupations have officer shortages,
thus making it difficult to maintain a pool of highly
qualified personnel. Congress has responded to some
critical shortages of highly qualified officers by passing
laws dealing with authorization for special incentive pays
(i.e., Aviation Officer Continuation Pay, Submarine Pay,
Sea Pay). Additionally, service billets require the skills
of these scarce officers in operational units and head-
quarters staffs. Therefore, service needs will compete
with Joint Duty Assionmeuts for the same limited officer
resources. As a result, service personnel managers must
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allocate scarce officer resources between service related
needs and joint requirements based on individual officer
qualifications.
C. JOINT PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION SELECTION
ANALYSIS
Each of the military departments has its own particular
view of Professional Military Education. As explained in
chapter IV, the Army clearly demonstrates the importance of
completing both the intermediate and senior level schools
by having the highest enrollment figures of all services.
Table X in chapter IV showed 1004 Army students at the
intermediate level schools (50 percent of all students) and
338 students in senior level schools (39 percent of all
students). The Navy has shown less concern in acquiring
Professional Military Education, but a greater interest at
the senior level (184 Navy students at the senior level
schools represented 46 percent of all Navy PME students).
The Navy had viewed it important that an officer be
screened and qualified to attend PME, but actual attendance
has not previously been required for advancement. The
Army, on the other hand, has virtually required completion
of intermediate PME for promotion to lieutenant colonel.
The Air Force selection boards operate as a screen and
then actually designate school assignments based upon a
review of the officer's personnel iecords. The Mirine
Corps personnol managers recommend nominees for inter-
mediate level schools to the Marine Corps Director of
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Personnel Management for approval. The Commandant of the
Marine Corps approves senior level school selections.
The services' philosophy on the criticality of Profes-
sional Military Education is somewhat reflected in the
assignment practices to the various schools. The
enrollment in intermeaiate and senior level schools are
presented ir -fable xv and Table XVI. Basically, these
tables show the relative size and percentages of officers
enrolled in the professional military schools. Table XV,
which was also presented in chapter IV. is shown &gain to
illustrate that attending PME is a rare event. Table XV
clearly shows the Army sends the most officers to the
intermediate level schools, but those officers represent
only six percent of the Army's 0-4 population per year.
The Navy sends the lowest percentage (1.6) of its officers
to intermediate level PME, and only the Marine Corps sends
fewer officers (208) than the Navy (215).
Table XVI is now introduced to illustrate that even
fewer 0-5/0-6s receive the opportunity for Professional
Military Education. Again, the Ar'y sends the most
students (338), while the Army and the Marine Corps each
have sent relatively the same percentage of the 0-5/0-6
population to senior level school (2.2 percent for the Army
and 2.7 percent for the Marine Corps). The Navy and Air
Force each send about 1.6 percert of their 0-5/0-6
population per year. Limited school s6ats available
combined with the operational requirements and the command
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TABLE XV OFFICERS IN INTERMEDIATE LEVEL PROFESSIONAL
MILITARY EDUCATION (ACADEMIC YEAR 1987-1988)
Number of Total Number Percentage
SERVICE Intermediate of Majors/Navy Intermediate
PME Lieutenant Students of
Students Commanders Total O-4s
(o-4s)
ARMY 1004 16,791 6.0
NAVY 215 13,614 1.6
AIR FORCE 584 19,615 3.1
MARINE CORPS 208 3,214 6.5
Source: Student numbers from schools. Number of
majors/Navy lieutenant commanders from "DOD Military
Manpower Statistica" September 30, 1988. [Ref. 8:114]
TABLE XVI OFFICERS IN SENIOR LEVEL PROFESSIONAL MILITARY
EDUCATION (ACADEMIC YEAR 1987-1988)
Number of Total Number Percentage
SERVICE Senior of of
PME 0-5/0-6a Students of
Students Total 0-5/0-6s
ARMY 338 15,287 2.2
NAVY 184 11,797 1.6
AIR FORCE 280 17,935 1.6
MARINE CORPS 62 2,263 2,7
Source: Student numbers from schools. Number of O-5/0-6s
from "DOD Military Manpower Statistics" September 30,
1988.
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opportunities for these officers could be contributing
factors to the low level of senior school enrollment.
Joint Professional Military Education enrollment in the
service schools is becoming more joint-oriented as
evidenced by Table XVII and illustrated in Figures 5-8.
Table XVII shows each of the service schools' enrollment
figures for 1987-1988, 1989-1990, and projected figures for
1990-1991. Of particular interest is the overall increase
!.n intermediate level enrollment by each service. These
increases are more apparent in Figures 5-8. The Navy's
enrollment changes are clearly evidenced in Figures 5, 7,
and 8. Although intermediate level school enrollments have
increased, the senior level school enrollment numbers
remain essentially the same (see Table XVII).
The Army sends so many officers to its intermediate
service school that the other services' involvement appears
negligible in Figure 5. Furthermore, each of these graphs
show how the host service dominates enrollment at each
service school. Higher student enrollment by the host
services' officers is appropriate because the intent of the
education review and subsequent restructuring was not to
make each school a "purple suit" education institution, but
for each school to maintain its service-oriented
perspective while integrating more joint exposure and
education into its syllabi. The Navy intormediate school,
as shown in Figure 6 appears to have the most equitable
101
TABLE XVII STUDENT ENROLLMENT DISTRIBUTION FOR
SERVICE SCHOOLS
AIP MARINE
SMHOOL YEAR ARMY NAVY FORCE CORPS
ARMY 87-88 819 3 40 18
COMMAND & 89-90 861 8 40 16
STAFF 90-91 1100 10 50 20
NAVAL 87-88 32 97 12 21
COMMAND & 89-90 31 84 15 23
STAFF 90-91 31 102 30 23
AIR 87-88 44 4 433 7
COMMAND & 89-90 44 11 422 10
STAFF 90-91 44 26 407 10
MARINE 87-88 12 9 2 123
COMMAND & 89-90 12 12 12 121
STAFF 90-91 12 24 12 120
ARMY 87-88 201 8 18 9
WAR 89-90 200 8 18 9
COLLEGE 90-91 200 8 18 9
COLLEGE 87-88 34 98 13 28
NAVAL 89-90 30 98 15 27
WARFARE 90-91 30 101 15 27
AIR 87-88 20 10 169 5
WAR 89-90 20 9 164 5
COLLEGE 90-91 20 10 164 5
Source: Secretary of Defense Report, "Professional
Military Education in the Services" August 8, 1990.
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student representation and distribution among the service
schools.
The change in focus of each school to include more
joint oriented education and to have improved service
representation is just beginning. The Phase II program
will have its first graduates in 1990. Each of the
services is committed to fulfilling the JPME requirements
of Title IV for Joint Specialists. The next few years of
implementing Phase I and Phase I1 education sequencing will
demonstrate the effectivenesi and weaknesses of the two-
phased educational systems design.
D. NOMINATION AND SELECTION OF JOINT SPECIALTY OFFICERS
The policy memoranda and guidance issued by the
Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have
allowed the services to begin implementing the provisions
of Title IV. Legislative changes and the resolution of
particular issues of eligibility and requirements navo
caused some initial Department of Defense and service
response delays. Integrating the requirements of the law
and the appropriate policy guidance concerning waivers and
eligibility delayed initial JSO selection and Nomination.
The 1988 Secretary of Defense Report to Congress
reported 12,165 officers had been selected for the Joint
Specialty. This initial cadre of Joint Specialists
consisted of several waiver groups as shown in Table XVIII.
Officers fully qualified without waivers are listed as Type
I. Type I includes officers who have completed both a
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TABLE XVIII SELECTION OF OFFICERS FOR AWARD OF THE
JOINT SPECIALTY (1988)
SERVICE TYPE OF QUALIFICATION
TYPE TYPE TYPE TYPE TYPE TOTAL
I II II IV V
ARMY 215 40 2457 1420 310 4442
NAVY 47 23 1792 1017 0 2880
AIR FORCE 178 47 1961 1477 184 3847
MARINE 15 3 581 349 48 996
CORPS
DOD 455 114 6791 4263 542 12165
NOM: TYPE I includes officers who have completed both ajoint professional military education (JPME) course and a
subsequent joint duty assignment (JDA). TYPE II includes
officers who have completed both the joint education and
assignment perequisites but required a waiver for the
sequence of the prerequisites. TYPE III includes officers
who have completed a JDA, but required a waiver for thejoint education course. TYPE IV includes officers who
completed a joint education course, but received a waiver
for completing a JDA. TYPE V includes officers who
qualified for the joint specialty under the critical
occupational specialty (COS) provision of the law.
SOURCE: Secretary of Defense Report to Congress (FY 1988)
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joint professional military education course and a joint
duty assignment. Only 455 officers (or 3.7 percent) were
fully qualified by the normal JPME-JDA sequencing. Type 1I
includes officers that have completed JPME and JDA but
required a sequencing waiver. Only 114 officers (or less
than one percent) qualified as Type II. Officers that have
completed a JDA, but required a waiver for JPME are
identified as Type III qualified. More officers qualified
as Type III than any other category, 6,791 (or 55.8
percent). These officers were primarily from the pool of
officers with previous JDA experience. Type IV identifies
qualified officers that have completed a joint education
course, but needed a JDA completion waiver. Maniy officers,
4,263 (or 35 percent), were also initially selected as JSOs
in the Type IV category. Officers that qualified for the
Joint Specialty under the critical occupational specialists
provisons of the law are listed as Type V. There were 542
officers (or 4.5 percent) qualified as Type V JSOs. Each
department's initial qualifications were appropriate for
their relative overall size and the quantity of service
billets on the Joint Duty Assignment List.
The 1989 summary of officers qualified for the Joint
Specialty by service and type of qualification are shown in
Table XIX. This Table shows that most officers (3,735 or
nearly 70 percent) again qualified for the Type III
category of the Joint Specialty. These Type III officers
have completed a Joint Duty assignment, but required m JPME
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TABLE XIX SELECTION OF OFFICERS FOR AWARD OF THE
JOINT SPECIALTY (1989)
SERVICE TYPE OF QUALIFICATION
TYPE TYPE TYPE TYPE TYPE TOTAL
I II II IV V
ARMY 33 27 1315 820 15 2210
NAVY 8 7 628 202 0 845
AIR FORCE 30 39 1537 241 10 1857
MARINE 12 1 255 160 3 431
CORPS
DOD 83 74 3735 1423 28 5343
NOM: TYPE I includes officers who have completed both a
o professional military education (JPME) course and a
subsequont joint duty assignment (JDA). TYPE 11 includes
officers who have completed both the Joint education and
assignment prerequisites but required a waiver for the
sequence of the prerequisLtes. TYPE III includes officers
who have completed a JDA, but required a waiver for thejoint education course. TYPE IV includes officers who
completed a joint education course, but received a waiver
for completing a JDA. TYPE V includes officers who
qualilLed for the joint specialty under the critical
occupational specialty (COS) provision of the law.
SOURCE: Secretary of Defense Report to Congress (FY 1989)
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waiver. Type 1V qualifications had the next highest number
of officers qualifying for the Joint Specialty with 1,423
officers (26.6 percent). Again, the authority to waive the
JDA requirement helped to qualify these officers. The
waiver period ended October 1, 1989. Therefore, future JSO
designations should be primarily Type I--having completed
both JPME and JDA requirements.
The distribution of officers who have been awarded the
Joint Specialty is comparable to the distribution of
officers in grades 0-4 and above for all the services.
Figure 9 shows the distribution of officers in grades 0-4
and above compared with the distribution of officers
awarded the Joint Specialty. The Army and Marine Corps
both show a slightly higher percentage of Joint Specialists
relative to the other services. This could be expected, as
the Army and Marine Corps send more of their officers to
Professional Military Education (see Table XV and XVI of
this chapter) and therefore, had a large eligible pool for
the initial waiver period.
E. ANALYSIS OF THE JOINT DUTY ASSIGNMENT LIST
Distribution of the Joint Duty Assignment List has
remained relatively constant through the first four years.
Table XX shows the percentages of billets on the JDAL that
each service has had for the four year span. Of particular
interest is the observation that no service ratio has
changed by even one percent. Although the actual billets
have changed in comiposition, rank, service affiliation, and
111
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qualification criteria, the entire JDAL has only grown from
8,222 to 8,907 billets.
TABLE XX JOINT DUTY ASSIGNMENT LIST COMPOSITION BY SERVICE
(PERCENTAGES OF TOTAL JDAL)
SERVACE . YEAR
1987 1988 1989 1990
ARMY 36.2 36.5 36.2 36.4
NAVY 21.6 21.4 21.6 20.8
AIR FORCE 36.8 36.8 36.8 37.2
MARINE CORPS 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.5
N 8222 8363 8623 8907
Source: Joint Staff, J-1
Furthermore, the trends shown in Figures 3 and 4 of
Chapter IV showed the constant distribution that each of
the Services has maintained. The entire JDAL and the COS
billets on the JDAL also show th&at the size of the JDAL has
remained stable. The stability of the size and composition
of the JDAL is important for planning th.i required flow of
potential JSOs through the JPME phases since fifty percent
of the JDAL billets must be filled by Joint Specialist,
Joint Specialist nominees, or Critical Occurational
Specialty officers. In addition, eighty percei.c of the
designated critical billets must be filled by JSO nominees
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or JSOs. After January 1, 1994, 100 percent of the
critical JDAL billets must be filled by JSOs or JSO
nominees. Consequently, having a stable JDAL contributes
to the efficiency of placing JSO nominees in the JPME or
JDA structure.
F. JOINT DUTY ASSIGNMENT MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM
The Joint Duty Assignment Management Information Systom
(JDAMIS) is designed to assist with the management of
billet assignments. JDAMIS has not yet been validated and
is being used more as a system to help generate annual
reports than as a personnel management tool.
Maintaining the service data base is a lengthy process
because of frequent modifications that have occurred in
developing the system. The personnel data and billet data
have potential to be used to match qualified people to
billets. Keeping the billets updated with individual
billet modifications that occur at the various joint
commands is centralized through the Joint Staff. No
billets are to be modified without service and Joint Staff
approval. The jDAMIS data base includes files on joint
billets, joint duty incumbents, promotions, JPME, joint
duty qualifications and waiver file information. These




Blending the joint manpower management procedures with
personnel assignment requirements and qualifications is the
essential task of JSO management. The JPME selection,
assignment, and follow-on tours to JDAs or other duty are
critical steps towards JSO designation. The stability of
the Joint Duty Assignment List will help to produce the
Joint Specialists for Joint Duty Assignment matches.
Getting specifically qualified officers positioned through
JPME to fill specific JDA billets remainii a key challenge.
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VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOICENDATTONS
A. SUMMARY
This thesis explored the development and need for the
creation of the Joint Specialty Officer established by
Title IV of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986. Two of the primary purposes
behind the development of the JSO were to improve the
quality and increase the continuity of experienco of
officers placed in Joint Duty Assignments (JDA). The
complexity and detailed requirements of the legislation
were presented illustrato the extent and magnitude of
the mandated personnel management processes.
The Joint Professional Military Education (JPME)
selection and assignment procedures and Joint Specialty
Officer Designation procedures of the military service
departments were presented and analyzed. The size and
composition of the Joint Duty Assignmsnt List (JDAL) were
also examined. The analysis indicated significant progress
has occurred in implementing the requirements of Title IV
and developing Joint Specialty Officers.
B. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The complexity of Title IV and the Joint Officer
management problem involves meeting many requirements and
qualifications for the officers assigned to Joint Duty
Assignments. The introduction of the two-phase Joint
Professional Military Education system to qualify
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prospective JSOs contributes to the complexity of personnel
managers assignment options. Since the waiver period for
JDA or JPME waivers expired in 1989, the personnel maangers
must identify and track JSO nominees and JSOs to ensure
appropriate Joint Duty Assignment opportunities are
capitalized.
The analysis of JPME, JSO designations, and the JDAL
leads to the conclusion that the Joint Specialty
designation process requires increased manpower assignment
flexibility. Specifically, not all Phase I JPME graduates
will attend Phase II JPME enroute to their JDAs.
Therefore, those officers who must attend Phase II JPME
during their JDA or after their JDA tour should be
identified and targeted to attend Phase II JPME to meet the
JSO designation criteria. Joint Duty commands must be
willing to send officers to Phase II JPME during their JDA
even though this is costly, as the officer will not be able
to contribute to the productivity of the command during the
three month school. The other option is to send the
officer to Phase II after the JDA enroute to his or her
next assignment. Operational requirements at the JDA
command and next duty command will compete with the JSO
Phase II education requirement. Additional study is
warranted on the assignment efficiency of officers that do
not attend Phase II enroute to their JDA. An examination
of the timing, costs, and difficulties of attending Phase
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II JPME could lead to a more effective method of obtaining
the Phase II education.
The JSO designation process outlined in Chapter IV is a
valid methodology for designating officers for the Joint
Specialty. Figure 1 in Chapter IV outlines the basic
process and Figure 2 describes the four primary avenues
towards JSO designation. The intent of the law is fi-at
obtain the joint education, then serve in a JDA.
Exceptions are permitted for COS officers and the Secretary
of Defense can waive the JPME-JDA sequence on a case-by-
case basis. The exceptions are designed to improve the
efficiency and personnel manager flexibility in assignment
policies.
This two-phase education system designed to bridge
officers' perspectives from service-orientation to joint-
orientation is importantr however, the improved quality of
officers assigned to JDA can help to achieve the objective
of increased operational effectiveness in joint operations.
The required educational sequence should be waivable for
any officer who can serve in a Joint Duty Assignment prior
to JPME, not only COS officers. The knowledge gained
through joint duty experience coupled with high quality
officer input can help keep operational effectiveness high
without the rquired JPME-JDA sequencing. The rigid JPME-
JDA sequencing for non-COS officers becomes less critical
with multiple JDA tours since Joint Specialists can serve
in more than one JDA during their careers. Furthermore,
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one of the objectives of designating Joint Specialists is
to allow those designated officers to serve multiple tours.
The management of the Joint Duty Assignment List
appears to be stable and the reduced fluctuations between
billets authorized on the JDAL should reduce inefficiencies
in preparing and assigning the right people to the right
billets. Many joint duty billets are not, however on the
JDAL for joint duty credit. Assignment to a command rather
than to specific billets could be an alternative method of
managing Joint Duty Assignments.
The Joint Staff could manage the joint assignment
billets at the organizational command level instead of the
billet level. Critical joint assignments could still be
identified by billet, if required, but the Joint Duty
Assignment organization commanders should have the
authority to assign joint officers where their skills and
qualifications can be used most effectively for that
command. This will simplify the Joint Duty Assignment
process and give added flexibility to the service personnel
and manpower managers.
The Joint Duty Assignment Management Information System
(JDAMIS) can be used more by the services as a manpower
management tool. As the database system is used to help
with standard routine procedures, the upkeep will become
more of a help than an administrative burden to the
services' manpower managers. The computer system reduces
report generating time and can improve accuracy with anl
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updated and frequently used database. Furthermore, th,
manpower managers will have a vested interest in the
quality and accuracy of the database if used for frequently
occurring JDA, JPME, JSO, and other personnel assignment
purposes. An updated user-friendly manual for updating and
managing the systems database will be beneficial for the
Joint Staff and each of the military department's personnel
manpower managers.
Title IV implementation progress is demnstrated by the
adjustments to the legislation that were intitated by the
department of Defense and the Congress. The revision to
JPME will have a major impact on the production efficiency
of awarding the Joint Specialty. Although the benefits of
reducing the required minimum joint duty tour lengths and
extending the JSO transition period helped with the
implementation progress, the two-phase JPME system has
made implementing Title IV more difficult. The rigid
three-month Phase II JPME sequencing makes for tough
choices for joint commanders. Mandating compliance with
Phase II attendance will work, but at a potential cost of
vacant joint billets.
The operational impact of one-year JPME combined with a
minimum two-year or three-year JDA tour will become more
apparent as the size of the Armed Forces is reduced by the
p.roposed 25 percent during 1990-1995. This minimum
combined 3-4 year period to develop and "grow a JSO" will
result in benefits to the Joint Duty Assignment commands as
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the improvod quality and stability goals for the JSO
program are met. The costs include the potential
deterioration of war-fighting skills and opportunity costs
of losing these personnel from their primary service
occupations.
As the size of the Armed Forces and associated budgets
are reduced, the return for the investment of high quality,
stable joint-oriented staff will increase. Future military
operations will most likely require a joint perspective in
both planning and execution. The individual service
departments will also benefit from having joint-oriented
and indoctrinated officers return to their prinary
occupational specialties with more joint education,
experience, and a joint perspective.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Future research can focus on implementing JDAMIS to
identify vacancies and required qualifications to help
ensure officers are assigned efficiently. Since, by law, a
large percentage of the joint assignments will be filled
directly by graduates of JPME, improvements in forecasting
will particularly enhance the selection of JPME students.
Earlier forecasting could also promote improved matching of
qualified officers with specific billet requirements.
The impact and effect of the two-phase JPME system on
the JSO qualification sequencing and filling subsequent
Joint Duty Assignment billets can be examined. The
possibility of using a non-resident Phase II course with
121
perhaps a minimum one-week or two-week seminar period for
application and war gaming could be explored as an
alternative approach to qualifying officers for the Phase
II education. The JPME requirments and educational bridge
towards acquiring a joint perspective might be achieved by
an effective non-resident course combined with seminars
composed of officers representing each branch of the armed
forces. Investigating the potential for non-resident JPME




EXAMPLES FROM THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE'S
REPORT TO CONGRESS (FY1989)
Selection of Officers for Award of the Joint Specialy (PYi 989) Talnlf A-1
service 1 11 II IV V Total
Army 33 27 1315 820 15 2210
Navy a 7 628 202 0 845
USIVC 12 1 255 160 3 431
USAF 30 39 1537 241 10 185?5
DOD 83 74 3735 1423 28 5343
NOTES: TYPE I includes officers who have completed buth a joint praofessonal military
education (JPMC) course end a subsequent joint duty assignment (JOA). TYPE 11 includes
officers who have completed both the joint education and asisgnmerit prerequisites, bit
required a waiver for the sequence of the prerequisites. TYPE III Includes officers who have
comipleted a JDA, but required a waiver tor the joint education courtse, TYPE IV Includes
officers who completed a joint edutation course, but received a waiver for completing a JDA.
TYPE V Includes officers who qualified for the joint apecialty under the critical occupational
specialty (COS) provision of the low.
Critical Occupational Specialties Table A-2
The following military specilaties, listed by service, are designated as critical occpational specialties. In every case, the specialties
rto desiglnated are each services$ "Combat arms" specialties.
Army Navy usAr U5111C
infantry Surface Pilo infantry
Amor Submariners Navigator Tanks/MVY
Auitleary Aviation Air Weapons Direciora Artillery
Air Defense Artillery $EAU'C Mi111le Operationso Air Control/Air Sugoocrt/AritiAir
Aviation Special Operations Spacie Operatmons& Aviation
Special Operatons Operationa Mgt Engineers
Comnbatl Enineers
a Combat arms military occupational specialties which hae" a severe shortage of officeirs,
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Critical Occupational Specialty Officers Table A-3
Cateoory Army Navy USAF USMC Total
JSO Nominee 139 173 1099 97 1508
JSO Nominee in a ,DA IO 1& 986 90 1175
JSO Nominee in a JDA, no JPME 4M 43'V 967 I9 114r0
Completed a JDA end at JPME 2 it 7 0 20
Comoitted JPME in FY 89 326 1 al. 266 160 9W
Selected lor JSO 146 546 961 272 2927
Critical Occupational Specialty Officers Table A-4
2nd JDA Critical JO•A,
ro __ O,___ _ r_ ,__ _ro._0
Have Are mave Are Have Are Have Are
Srwd srvg Tti Sr#d rng Tit Srvd Srvg TU Srve Sr, '(TI
Army 10 123 133 0 26 26 1 34 35 0 1 1
Navy 0 13 13 0 3 3 0 3 3 0 1 1
USAF 0 25 25 2 1 3 0 7 7 3 1 4USMC __ __ L 2-2 .- .-- -2- _1_ .- -. ___-L_ _Q_ _._ I
Total 10 163 173 2 32 4 1 45 44 3 4 7
Officers Nominated for the Joint Specialty Table A-S








JOINT DUTY ASSIGNMENT OBJECTIVES
Annual Report on FY 1989 Promotion Rates
Promotion rates required by the DoD Reorganization Act of 1986, with the intent to mea.
sure the quality of officers assigned to joint duty, are attached in the following pages. Brief
explanations for the "in zone" cateaories where the required promotion objectives were
not met are consolidated in Table ,-& As reported in September 1S89, the Joint Staff and
joint commanders have seen a noticeable improvement in the Quality of officers assigned.
Since that report was submitted, a joint study group has begun looking at the current
methods of measuring the quality of officers to determine if the Department is capturing
the best data available. Preliminary results of that group's effort show that promotion
rates appear to be the best objective measure of quality; however, this methodology does
have some shortcomings,
For example, many cases where promotion objectives were not achieved were a result
of small populations, many where only one officer with joint experience was eligible, and
cases where one additional selectee would have meant meeting or exceeding the promo.
tion objective. Also, FY 1989 bo4,rds contained some officers who were still in joint duty
assignments based on preoAct assignment practices - the net result being lower joint
promotion rates. It will be another year before the joint promotion statistics fully reflect
the post.Goldwater.Nichols assignment practices.
Other areas of concern include the above/below zone statistics and the exclusion of
some officers from the statistics. Above and below zone statistics are difficult to compare
and analyze because of the extremely low promotion opportunity in these zones. Addition.
ally, the different promotion philosophies for above/below zone promotion& of the Services
complicates the analysis. Furthermore, the requirement to exclude Joint specialty officers
serving in the "other joint duty" category does not appear to be a reasonable measure
of the quality in this category. Lastly, many quality officers assigned to joint duty will not
be reflected in the statistics for many years. For example, on the FY 1989 Army Colonel
Selection Board, due to assignment timing, 147 of the 540 officers selected in.zone were
senior service college students. When these officers are Included In the statistics based
on their subsequent assignments (2 months after the board), the joint promotion rates
are considerably higher (see Note #5 In Table ik-6).
The joint study group. is looking closely at these areas of concern to determine better
ways to monitor the Department's progress toward this important objective of assigning
quality officers to joint duty.
NOTE: In the tables that follow, a dash (-) Indicates there were no eligible officers In that
category and a "N/A" means that no such category exists for that rank.
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Promotion Rates Ta'le A-6
Are Serving In Have Served in
S (11 Percent) (ln Percent)
Joint In Below Above In Below Above
Rank Categorles Zone Zone Zone Zone Zone Zone Remarks
Air Force Promotion Rates (Line)
0.8 Joint Staff ?5 N/A N/A 50 N/A N/A See note 2
Joint Specialty 38 N/A NIA 38 N/A N/A
Service MQS 37 N/A N/A 14 N/A N/A
Other Joint 0 N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A Seo not# 1
Service Average 36 N/A N/A 36 N/A N/A
0.7 Joint Staff 4 N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A See note 2
Joint Specialty 3 N/A N/A 3 N/A N/A See note 3
Service HQS 4 N/A N/A 2 N/A N/A
Other Joint 0 N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A See notes 2& 3
Service Average 2 N/A N/A 2 N/A N/A
0,6 Joint Staff Se 2 40 67 0 - See note 2
Joint Specialty 68 5 14 66 5 14
Service HQS 59 4 11 b8 23 7
Other Joint 42 1 G 27 1 3 See notes 3 4
Service Average 4 3 3 U4 3 3
0.5 Joint Staff 91 8 60 100 0 0. Ste note 2
Joint Specialty 93 6 67 93 6 33 See note 2
Servicel QS 92 6 19 100 14 0
Other Joint 70 2 10 69 3 9
Service Average E 3 7 64 3 7
0.4 Joint Staff
Joint Specialty
Service HQs (No Soard in IrY 89)
Other Joint
Service Average
Army Promotion Rate" (AUmy Competitive Category)
0. Jont Staff 33 - N/A 33 - N/A See note 2
Joint Specialty 47 - N/A 47 - N/A lee note 2
Service HQS 40 - N/A 50 - N/A
Other Joint 46 - N/A M - N/A
Service Average 36 - N/A 36 - N/A
0.7 Joint Staff I - N/A 2 - N/A See note 2.
Joint Specialty 3 - N/A 3 - N/A See note 3
Service HQS 2 - N/A 7 - N/A
Other Joint 7 - N/A 6 - N/A
Servic Average 2 - N/A 2 - N/A
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Promotion Rates (Continued) Tabl~e A-6
Are Serving In Nave Served In
(in Percarit) (IM Percent)
Joint In Below Above In Bleow Above
Rank Cntegorles Zon# Zone Zone Zone Zone zone Remarks
0.6 Joint Statf 53 0 6 17 5 - See note 3
Joint Specialty 47 2 2 47 2 -
Servico HQS 40 0 0 35 4 -
Other Joint 28 0 1 Q2 0 - See note 5
Service Avierago 41 2 1 41 2 -
0.5 Joint Stall 100 )7 0 100 0 -
.1oint Specialty 79 7 16 79 6 23 Seo note 4
Service MQS 80 7 12 75 i8 25
Other Joint 68 15 2 49 2 2 See note 4
Sereice Average 61 6 5 61 6 5
0.4 Joint Staff 100 - - 100 100 -
Joint Specialty - - - - - -
Service HQS 86 11 - as 11 -
Other Joint 86 - - 86 - --
Service Average 69 3 19 69 3 19
Marine Corps Promotien Rales (Unrestricted)
0.8 Joint Staff - - N/A - - N/A
jointt Specialty 4 - N/A 44 - N/A Sao note 6
Servics 4QS 75 - N/A 20 - N/A
Other Joint - - N/A so N/A
Service Average 42 - N/A 42 - N/A
0.7 Joint Stanf 25 - N/A 0 - N/A See note I
Joint Specialty A - N/A - - N/A
Service "Q3 4 - N/A *2 - N/A
Other Joint 40 - N/A 0 - N/A See notelI
Ser'vicAvirgep 3 - N/A 3 - N/A
04 Joint Staff 100 0 10 - 0 -
Joint specialty 40 0 0 60 - 0 See note 2
ServiceNOS 63 0 11 62 0 8
Other Joint- 39 0 13 33 0 0 See note 2
Servce Average 45 0 6 45 0 6
0-jJoint Stail 78 0 - 100 0 -
Joint specify 78 0 0 78 0 0
Service NQ8 78 0 4 67 0 11
Other Johit 75 0 0 40 0 29 See 'tet 2
Sere Averaq 40 0 6 60 0 6
0.4 joint Saff - - - - - -
Joint pecialt 25 67 0 0
Sarvce I4QS 6 5 6
Other Joint 33 0 0 50 - 0 See note 3
Service Average 67 0 17 67 - 17
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Promotion Rates (Continued) Table A-4
Are Serving In Have Served In
(In Percent) (In Percent)
Joint In Below Above In below Above
Rank Categories Zone Zone Zone Zone Zone Zone Remarks
Navy Promotion Rates
08 Unrestricted Line Joint Staff - - N/A - - N/A
Joint Specialty so it N/A - - N/A
Service HQS so 40 N/A - - NI/A
Other Joint 33 0 N/A - - N/A Soo note 2Service Average 54 17 N/A - - N/A
Cryotology Joint Staff 100 - NJA - - N/A
Joint Specialty - - N/A - - N/A
Servici, HQS - - N/A - - N/A
Other Joint - - N/A - - N/A
S4ervce Average 100 - NIA - - N/A
Supply Joint Staff - - /A. - - N/A
Joint Specialty 100 0 N/A - - N/A
Service HQS - - N/A - - N/A
Other Joint - - N/A - - N/A
Service Average "7 17 N/A - - N/A
0.7 Unrestricted Line Joint Staff 0 6 - - - N/A See note 2
Joint Specialty 2 3 - - 10 N/A See note 2
Service HQS 3 a - - - N/A
Other Joint 0 1 - - - N/A See note 2
Seovrti Avrage 1 3 - - 3 N/A
Civil Engineer Joint Staff - - N/A - - N/A
JointiSpecialty 0 0 N/A - - N/A
Seavmc NQS 0 0 N/A - - N/AOther Joint 0 0 N/A - - N/AServc Average 0 0 N/A - - N/A
Engineering Outy Jont Staff - - N/A - - NI/A.
Joint speciaty 0 0 N/A - - N/A
ServiceNoS 0 0 N/A - - N/A
Ottr oint - 0 N/A - - N/A See note I
Se viceAverage 0 9 N/A -- N/A
Public AfAirs, Joint &Atff 0 - N/A - - N/A See note I
Untspecialty 20 0 N/A 20 - N/A See note 6
11eofV cNo 50 - N/A - - N/A
Other Jint 0 0 N/A - - N/A See note 2
Se viceAverae 11 0 N/A 11 - NIA
SURl*y JoitSt waff 0 0 N/A - - N/A
Joint Spcialty• 0 1 N/A - - N/A
Servict 14Q$ 0 0 N/A - - N/A
Othfer Joint 0 0 N/A - - N/A
Service Aver 0 3 N/A - - N/A
tee
Promotion Rates (Continued) rable A-6
Are Serving in Have Served IN(In Percent) (in Percent)
Joint In Oelow Above In Be!ow Above
Rank Categories Zone Zone Zone Zone Zone Zone Remarks
0.6 Unrestricted Line Joint Staff 67 0 25 - 0 -
Joint Specilaty 70 0 0 - - -
Service HQS 38 2 0 100 0 -
Other Joint 28 0 0 0 0 0 See note 7
Service Average 49 2 2 49 2 -
Civil Engineer Joint Staff - - - - - -
Joint Specialty 0 0 - - - - So* note 2
Service HQS so 0 -. - - -
Other Joint 0 0 0 - - - See note 1
Service Average A6 0 11 - - -
Aeronautical Engineer Joint Staff - - -.
Joint speclalty 0 0 - See note 1
S ice HQ6i 100 0 -. . .
Other Joint - 0 0 - - -
servlu Average 45 0 7 - - -
Cryptology Joint Staff - - -.
Joint epleity 0 0 100 - - -
Service hQS 0 0 - - -
Other Joint 0 0 13 - - - See note 1
Service Average 3J 4 8 - --
Engineering Duty Joint Staff -. . . .
Joint Spec.alty - .. .
Serv:ce ,QS - 33 . . . .
Other Joint 0 0 -. .. . Sao note 1
Sevice Average s0 2 -. . .
Intelligence Joint aff t.. - - -
Joint secialty 0 0 0 - - -
seVAN N 0 0 0 - - -
Other Joint 0 0 a - - - See note 2
ervi Average 44 6 4 - - -
Obeanography Joint Staff 0 - -. 
Jont slpaaY 0 0 -.
Servl HQ$ 0 0 -oo . . .
Other Jolt - 0 -. . .
Service Average 55 3 .
PuNk Affairs Joint stuf - - -. .
Joint lSecialty 67 0 - be.. leenote asor#im MQ 100 0 -. . .
Other Jit. 7 0 0 - - -
Setw AYno 44 7 0 - - -
SpluA Jointtlff - 0 -.
Joint leclaiy 0 0 -. . .
ervio NO - 0 . . . .
Other Joint 14 0 0 - - - see note 2




Art Serving In Have Served In
(In Percent) (in ercent)
Joint In Below Above In Below Above
Rank CateGories Zenos Zone Zone Zone Zone Zone Rtemnarks
0.4 Unrestricted Line Joint Staff 67 0 0 - 0 0 See note 2
Joint Specialty - - - - - -
Service 14QS 75 4 0 100 0 0
Other Joint 55 1 0 so 0 - See note 3
Service Average 73 2 15 73 2 15
Cryptology Joint Staff - - - - - -
Joint Specialty - - -- -
Service WQS - 50 - -
Other Joint 0 0 0 - - - See note 2
Service Average 69 3 10 - -
Engineering Duty Joint Staff - - - - -
Joint Spiclalty - - -
Service HQS - - - - -
Other Joint so 0 - - - - See note 2
Service Average 78 1 - - - -
Inteli~gence Joint' Staff - - - - - -
Joint Specalty- - - - - -
Service HQS a
Other Joint 67 0 0 . 0 See note 2
Service Average so 2 0 2
Oceanography Joint Utfs"- 
-
Joint Specialty- - - - - -
serviceHQS- - - - -
Other Joint 67 0 - - - - See note 2
Servics Average 74 0 -. - - -
Supply Joint staff- - - - - -
Joint Specialty- - - - - -
Service iQS 0 - - - - -
Other Joint 57 0 0 - 0 - See note 2.
3eirvicaAverage 64 2 26 - 2 -
Notes:
I1. Small numbers involved - only ones officar with Woint experience eligible for promotion In this competitive category
2. Smaill numbers Involved - one additionall selection in this prmotion category needed to meet Promotion Objective.
3. Srnal numbers Inveold - less then 3 1/A% ef eliglible populatio; n:mperkmo anid analysis is lIWncocusive.
4. Within 2% of meetting promotien ebjeetv.
5.,It the Ilenioir Servics Cogla leudlents who were selected for promoto were Ir~udeid with their postPIME organization, the
Pr omoto rate for -other Joint Wut would have been 47% -. soemceifg be service evereg by 4%
6. Small numbers involveid - In amorwe Joint speclialist officer and ONe less Service Headquarters General Offier were selected.
the promotiion objective would have been met.
7. Several noneseloetes wore assigned to joint poeltkns under pm.DoC Reorganizatin Act assignment poilicies. Ndow quality
officers are being assigned to their poitafions, I1.. 0-6 promotion rates foir those assigned In 1969 were 73% compared to 49%
service average.
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Analysis of the Assignment Of Officers
Following Selection for the Joint Specialty "'able A-7
category Armhy Navy USAF USMC Total
Commanid 246 174 179 59 658
Servict HQ 130 89 54 46 319joint Staff
Critical 6 3 6 2 17
Other JOA 37 9 It 3 63
Total 43 12 20 5 s0
Other Joitm
Criticail 98 30 so 11 189
Othef JOA 293 70 123 33 509
Tots! 381 100 173 4. 95
PM! 192 93 70 16 3711
Other Oper 337 65 97 139' 638
Other staff 608 57b 306 63' 1034
Other Short - 357 - 14 .IL
The Informatlooi In this chart Identifies the first reassignmenrt of an officer following selection
for the joint specialty.
a For the Marine Corps, Other Opar a Fleet Marnno Force and Other Staff n non-Fleet
Marine Corp.b for Navy, Other Staff Includes other shore assignments.
Average Length of Tours of Duty In Joint Duty Assignments (FY 1989)(in Months) M14~ A-S
General/flag1 OfflBars
Mefat SUNf Oth11W Joint Joist Total
Aimy 26 26 26
Navy 28 29 26
USMIC is 27 28
USAF 216 29 28
DOD 24 27 27
Othelf Offileers
Amry as 40 40IF Navy 37 40 3
USKC 36 37 37
USA 40 41 41
a D00 37 40 40
a One of the f ne"asignents lIn this Clatgor was~ unsfiaty 61010% UWWioty
due to the change of aidminletraticins In early 1M6.
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Tour Length Exclusions 'able A-9
Catogory Army Navy USAr USMC Total
Retirement 49 74 107 is 245
Separation 0 10 2 0 12
Suspension From Duty 5 1 4 0 10
Compassionate/Medical s5 5 2 1 23
Other Joint After Promotion 2 0 1 0 3
Deaclivtloin of Unit 5 3 2 0 10
Joint Overseas 191 47 359 16 612
Joint Accumulation 33 0 0 0 33
COS Reassignment fill- 29 12 7. 123
Total Si 249 495 31 1071
Officer Distribution by Service (FY 1989) Ta~nle A-10
Other Total Jeint Total 0N0
Joint Sfta Joint Duty Dety* (Percent)
Army 305 2814 3119 (36.2%) 35.3
Navy 237 1627 164 (21.6%) 23.8
USMC 60 408 458(5.3%) 6.6
USA? 339 28.34 3173 (37.7%) 34,3
000 931 7721 623
arom Joint Dtjty Assignment List
Walver Authority Use Table A-11
SNavy USA USMC Total
Caltesory 00 ra m • a Go9 ra 0 Total
Al 27 1 7 0 15 0 4 0 57 1 Se
A2 42 0 3 0 23 7 13 4 $1 11 92
at 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 2
32 42 0 3 0 23 7 13 4 51 11 92
C1 3 NA 0 NA 1 NA 11 NA 15 NA 19
C2 24 NA 13 NA 37 NA 13 NA 87 NA 87
D0 44 7 26 4 16 5 4 0 t0 16 106
02 7M so 355 17 748 32 122 9 2020 97 2117
11 NA 2 NA 13 NA 17 NA 0 NA 32 32
,2 NA .42 NA 22 NA 32 NA 11 NA 107 107
F1 NA a NA 4 NA I NA 1 NA 10 10
F2 NA s0 NA is NA. 17 NA a NA 70 153
01 NA 1i NA 19 NA 33 NA 3 NA 7? 73
02 NA 30 NA is NA 17 -NA a NA 70 70
HI 2090 a 642 1 65 1806 24 416 0 516 I 5321
HI 41 0 3 0 23 7 13 14 31 11 92
1 * Waiver ywes eneroisat4
2 - No waiver was eaeral ad
Waivers ineudq: (A) JSO sequence waiver, (3) JSO twotour waiver, (CC) wiver @1of pot.JPMC JOA auignment for JSO. (t) JDA tour
length waiver, (E) CAPSTONE course waiver, (F) waiver for promotion to 0.7. (good of the service). (0) waiver for promotion to 0,.(sd/tech. Professional, joint equivalence, navy nuclear), and (H) temporlry waiver provisions for award of JSO.
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Critical Positions Summary "'able A-17
Category Army Navy USAF USMC TOTAL
Total Potitions 381 201 382 60 1024
Vacant 21( 6%) 15( 7%) 43(11%) 0( 0%) 79( 8%)
J50 Filled 276 (72%) 140(70%) 282(76%) 45(75%) 750(73%)
Non.JSO Filled 83 (22%) 46(23%) 50(13%) 15(25%) 194(19%)
percent Jso FIied Since I Jan 89 82 8s &A 82 04
Reasons Above Positions Wore Not Filled By Joint Specialty Officers
Position filled by incumbent Prior to being a joint position ........... G
Position being converted to a mnoncritical Position or being deleted, 8........
Joint Specialist Officers not availabe.ý........... I....... I.......I......I...15
Best Qualified Officers not a Joint Specialist .. ,...................., 18
Position fitled by incumbent pr ior to being a critical position ,.................. 47
Other............................................ ............ .38
Total .................. ................... ,....... ........ .. 19
JOA Posiftions Not Filled by Joint Specialists Table A-13




Office of Secretary of Defense (050) a
Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA)2
Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) 5
Defense Logistics Agency (OLA) 6
Defense Communications Agency (DCA) 12
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) 15
Defense Attaches 2
National Security Agency (NWA 5
Defense Mobilization Systems Planning Activity 1
US Atlantic Command (USLANTCOM) 8
US Caentraj Command (USCtNTOOM) 11
US European Command (USEUCOM) 14
US Paciftc Command (USPACOM) 21
US Southern Command (UUOUTNCOM) 9
US Special Opeirations, Command (USSOCOM) 2
Joint Special Operations Command (JIOC) 1
US Tfransoortatlion Command (USTRANSCOM) 2
NATO Military Committee I
Allied Command Europe (ACE) 20
Allied Command Ationtic (ACLANT) a
NQ North American Asr"spool Commiand 6
Combined Field Army (CFA) 3
Joint161 Staff 22
Nartional Defense Unkversty (NDU) 4
joint Strategiic Target Planning Staff (JITPI)
Joint Warfare Center (JWC)
Joint Ocootrines Center (JOC) I
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